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ABSTRACT
During the past decade in Japan, the sluggish economy has increased pressure on
the nation's finance and had a negative impact on the public investment decision of the
government. This has led to a reduced construction budget responding to the continuing
slump with an expansion in public works investment. Since the end of World War II, the
Japanese government has issued a huge amount of debt to finance public works. As a result,
the total debt (the government bonds, loans payable, and government short term securities,
or financing bills) added up to over 140% of GDP in 2002. To overcome the economic
crisis, since June 2001, the Koizumi Cabinet has advanced wide-ranging structural reforms.
Those include economic revitalization strategies, tax reform and reforms in major
government expenditures expressed as a commitment to small government.
As a part of these reform policies, the government has focused on the Private
Finance Initiative (PFI) in order to rebuild national and local government economy with the
purpose of achieving better partnerships between public and private sectors. Since the PFI
Law went into effect in September 1999 there were 98 PFI deals, including 9 services
started, 21 contracts completed and 68 guidelines announced for projects in Japan by
March 2002. The increased level of activity is expected to continue and the relationship
between public and private sector must change to meet the complex and challenging market
needs as the market grows in the future.
This thesis analyzes the current environment surrounding the Japanese PFI market
and the current issues concerning basic components of the PFI such as "Value For Money"
or risk transfer. This thesis also examines future possibilities for expanding the Japanese
Version of PFI in the construction market and proposes possible areas for private financing
including renewal works for aged infrastructure in the Japanese and overseas construction
market.
Thesis Supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: James Mason Crafts Professor of Engineering Systems
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Private Finance in Japanese Construction Industry
Japan is the world's second largest economy after the U.S., accounting for nearly one
fifth of the world GDP and more than two thirds of the East Asian GDP. However, after the burst
of the economic bubble there has been the desperate situation of failing banks and rising
unemployment for Japanese economy. Structural reform started by the government in 2001 has
proposed guiding principles of private financing for infrastructure.
Originally, development of infrastructure by private finance schemes was started in
Japan in the 1980s. In those days, the government strongly hoped for the recovery of the
Japanese economy by creating new private financing schemes for national land development.
Privatization, the Third Sector and Contracting-out (what is called outsourcing) in Japan have
been organized at the initiative of the national government, but the systems have hampered the
full-fledged initiatives of private sectors.
In Japan, based on a successful example in the U.K., Private Finance Initiative Law was
enforced in September 1999 and the first PFI application was started in March 2003. The
government has expected immediate results by the PFI scheme, but it takes at least 20 years from
the beginning of application. Moreover, in case PFI is applied in Japan, the previous U.K. system
must be modified to adapt to the environment surrounding Japanese construction market.
In order to achieve an effective public-private partnership in an effort to promote greater
decentralization, every public sector has to study its know-how and prepare for high future
growth of the PFI market. The efforts have just started in Japan and they hold the key to the
future of the local governments' economy.
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1.2. Objective of the Thesis
The implementation of PFI scheme has been just begun in Japan. Because the present PFI
scheme in Japan is an exact counterpart of the U.K. version, there are many issues to consider for
effective application of PFI and it still has a long way to adapt to the current environment in
Japan. It is time to establish the Japanese version of PFI for the realization of self-sustaining
economic growth.
The objectives of this thesis are to examine the issues of the previous private financing
scheme in Japan and observe Japanese version of PFI through the analysis of Japanese financial
circumstances. This thesis also describes the differences in application of PFI between Japan and
U.K. by analyzing statistical data of both countries' PFI market. Finally, it proposes future
potentials of the market.
1.3. Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part from Chapter 2 to Chapter 3
examines the socioeconomic, political and economic environment in Japan and evaluates the
major issues facing the Japanese economy and construction industry based on statistical data.
The second part from Chapter 4 to Chapter 6 initially explains the Private Finance
Initiative (PFI) scheme with the purpose of infrastructure development, and then examines U.K.
market trend and some issues that have developed since the government started PFI application
in 1992 until now. This part also discusses with statistical data on the PH market trend in Japan
how this scheme can be introduced into the Japanese construction market and how it can be
changed in the current market conditions. Finally, the last part, Chapter 7 suggests the future
potential of PFI in Japan and Chapter 8 summarizes this thesis with some recommendations for
future prospects of the PFI market in Japan.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Japanese Economic Trends
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
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Figure 1-1 Structure of the Thesis
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Chapter 2. Japan's Economy Surrounding
Construction Market
Till the early 1990s, Japanese business style was the role model of the
Asian economy, but after the burst of the economic bubble there has been the
desperate situation of failing banks and rising unemployment for Japanese economy.
The GNP of Japan is the second in the world and it is over Y500 trillion. Economic
growth rate was negative in 1998, but 1999 and 2000 turned slight positive. In this
severe environment, the Japanese economy, including local economy, is still heavily
depends on government bonds and this longstanding government policy seems
difficult to change easily.
To overcome the economic crisis, the Koizumi Cabinet has advanced
wide-ranging structural reforms since June 2001. Following this, in June 2002, the
Cabinet adopted the "Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Policy Management and
Structural Reform 2002" which includes economic revitalization strategies, tax reform
and reforms in major government expenditures expressed as a commitment to "small
government." In the structural reforms, fiscal decentralization and movement toward a
free market economy is also promoting to reduce fiscal deficits of the national and
local governments.
This chapter overviews the current situation and problems of Japanese
economy, especially excessive bond issue for public works. The data describes that
the local economy has been increasingly dependent on the national government
17
expenditures such as public investments although a large amount of national bond had
been already allocated to the rural areas for their public works. It explains that
expanding the self-revenue resources of local governments, or replacing the amount
of matching grants with the distribution of local transfer taxes is required to achieve
more appropriate resource allocation. Finally, this chapter describes current
environment surrounding construction industry by analyzing transition of existing
stock in Japan and analyzes the main problems of Japan' s economy and public
finance from the standpoint of how to deal with them in order to restore the Japanese
economy.
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2.1. Introduction of Macroeconomic Overview
The post-war development of the Japanese economy had brought about significant
benefit and great expansion in all sorts of business fields with changing industrial structure.
However, the Japanese economy has been struggling for the last decade since the burst of the
bubble economy in the 1990s. During this period, the Japanese-style employment practice and
corporate system that supported the post-war Japanese economy began to show cracks and
Japanese people have increasingly begun to have gloomy future prospects for the economy and
society. The economic recovery that began in the spring of 1999 proved to be short-lived and the
economy has been deteriorating since the beginning of 2001. The future prospects for the
Japanese economy has been increasingly uncertain as the global economy shows signs of
slowing down further due to the large-scale terrorist attacks in the United States in September.
In order to cope with the economic stagnation in the 1990s, the government repeatedly
implemented economic measures by expanding public investment and other government
spending. As a result, budget deficits have substantially increased combined with a decline in tax
revenues caused by slow growth and tax cuts. These measures, however, did not bring about a
sustainable recovery of private demand and failed to shore up the stagnant economy. Japan' s
fiscal conditions are in a very severe state. Since the collapse of the bubble economy in the early
1990s, slow economic growth and tax cuts have reduced tax revenues, while government
spending has expanded on frequent economic stimulus packages and rising social security costs.
As a result, the general government budget deficit has continued expanding and reached the
worst level among industrial countries.
19
2.2. Financial Circumstance of National Government
2.2.1. Current Financial Conditions
Figure 2-1 shows general government gross debt and financial balance as a percentage
of GDP, as compared to those of industrial nations. General government budget deficits (as a
percentage of GDP) have improved since the 1990s in all major industrial nations except Japan,
and deteriorated substantially only in Japan.
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Figure 2-1 General Government Gross Debt and Financial Balance
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Outstanding general government gross debts have leveled off or decreased since the
latter half of the 1990s in all major industrial nations except Japan. Those in Japan alone have
increased substantially. At the end of calendar year (CY) 2000, gross outstanding general
government debts in Japan exceeded those in Italy and were the largest among major industrial
nations. The figures show that massive budget deficits have remained in Japan as government
spending has far exceeded revenues.
2.2.2. Cumulative Government Bond Issue
Since the collapse of the bubble economy, Japan's outstanding debt issues have been
expanding considerably. The expansion in outstanding debt issues has resulted from slumping
revenues and increasing spending caused by the prolonged economic weakness, frequent
economic measures and increased social security costs. Figure 2-2 sets up the trends of annual
government bond issues. Annual government bond issues for the national general account stood
at Y18.4 trillion in FY 1997 before rising far beyond Y30 trillion from FY 1998 to 2000 on a
settlement basis. It also shows the bond dependency ratio(=Total bond issue/Total expenditure)
has remained at a high level after collapse of babble economy.
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Figure 2-2 Trends of Government Bond Issues
Figure 2-3 shows the trends of accumulated government bonds outstanding. Because the
national government's public investment has remained high in expenditure after increasing on
frequent economic stimulus packages following the collapse of the bubble economy,
accumulated bond outstanding was increased to an unprecedented level of Y395 trillion in
FY2001.
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Figure 2-3 Trends of Accumulated Government Bonds Outstanding
2.2.3. Total Government Long-term Debt Amounting to 140% of GDP
Figure 2-4 shows Japan's GDP and its growth rate during the last decade(Figures after
the year of 2002 are estimated). The budget deficit shown in Figure 2-5 has served to increase
outstanding long-term debts including government securities. A Ministry of Finance report of
2001 says the outstanding long-term debts of the national and local governments expanded from
$242.4 billion (about 60% of GDP) at the end of FY 1992, to about $540 billion (about 125%) at
the end of FY 1999. Outstanding debts at the end of FY 2002 are estimated at about $580 billion
(about 140%).
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2.3. Financial Circumstance of Local Government
2.3.1. Deteriorating Local Public Finance
There are some 3,300 local governments in Japan including prefectural and municipal
ones. The financial conditions for many local governments have deteriorated since the latter half
of the 1990s with their borrowings increasing. Present local public finance is in a state of crisis.
During a prolonged economic stagnation after the collapse of the babble economy, local
government revenues have declined on tax cuts as well as falling tax revenues mainly from the
two corporation taxes (corporation enterprise and inhabitants taxes). On the other hand, local
governments have expanded spending due to their positive investigation in the national
government's series of economic stimulus packages including additional public works. Local
governments have thus had to increase their debt issues and dip into reserves for future financial
demand including redemption of debt issues. The local budget balance (or real balance), which is
the gap between revenues (including proceeds from local government bond issues) and spending
(including debt-service costs) after adjustments for transfers of financial resources between years,
has deteriorated rapidly, especially for metropolitan governments since the early 1990s 1.
Financial reconstruction has become a key challenge for them.
2.3.2. Cumulative Local Bond Issue
During the prolonged economic slump in the latter half of the 1990s, local governments
have expanded debt issues to cover their public works spending and permanent local tax cuts
accompanying the national government' s economic stimulus packages. As a result, the rate of
dependence on debt issues, or debt issue proceeds' share of total revenues, expanded rapidly in
Source: Annual Report on Fiscal Statistics of Local Governments, Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs,
Posts and Telecommunications
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and after FY 1994 and has remained in a high range of 12% to 15%. In FY 2001, the rate stood at
13.3%. The range is the highest in history with the exception of one period in the mid-1970s. As
a result, outstanding local government bonds increased gradually from Y52.2 trillion in FY 1990
to Y125.6 trillion in FY 1999, a 2.4-fold jump. A redemption schedule for outstanding local
government bonds indicates that redemptions will expand toward the FY 2002-2005 period with
FY 2004 as a peak. Local governments will have to use the debt reduction fund (reserves for
future local debt redemptions) and other resources to control debts from the med- and long-term
viewpoint.
2.3.3. Revenue Bases of Local Governments
From the viewpoint of local autonomy, it is desirable for local governments to raise
financial resources for their administrative services by collecting tax from local citizens. In
reality, however, large economic gaps exist among the some 3,300 local governments ranging
from Tokyo with population of more than 11 million to Tokyo' s Aogashima Village with only
200. In FY 1999, local tax revenues slipped below 20% of total revenues for half (23) of the
prefectural governments and for some 60% (1,813) of the municipal governments. The revenue
bases of local governments are thus vulnerable in general.
In Japan, local governments are mainly responsible for providing public services. For
part of these services, the national government determines the mechanisms and standards to
ensure uniform nationwide administrative services. It has also provided national treasury
disbursement (including subsidies) and financial adjustments through the local allocation tax to
secure financial resources for local administrative services so that any local government can
implement systematic administrative management. This has allowed local governments with
vulnerable revenue bases to provide almost the same administrative services as others.
26
2.4. Financial Implication between National Government and
Local Governments
2.4.1. Capital Spending as a Fiscal Stimulus Device
Japan has had surges of national transfers to local governments in an effort to stimulate
the macro economy. These have largely been unsuccessful. As nationally subsidized capital
expenditures by local governments have risen, those expenditures that are not subsidized have
decreased. This displacement, or crowding-out, effect has served to offset some of the
stimulation effects of the counter cyclical policy. This has created problems because while the
stimulus packages have been diluted in their impacts, they have still resulted in the government
having large increases in debt that will be a burden on future budgets. According to the OECD,
the decrease in unsubsidized public works spending by local units of Y3.0 trillion from the
financial year 1993 to 1998 easily overwhelmed the increase in subsidized public works in the
same period 2. The stimulating effects of the national capital investment program have also been
questioned at a meso level because of their limited effects in the context of a changing economic
structure where the inputs of public capital are seen as being of limited important to the private
sector.
2.4.2. Expanding Budget Size for National and Local Governments
Local governments' annual spending increased from Y78.4 trillion in FY 1990 to Y101.6
trillion in FY 1999. The 1990s thus saw a 30% expansion. This is not only because the national
government implemented a series of economic stimulus packages to increase public works amid
a serious economic slump and a tax revenue slowdown, but also because local governments are
2 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2000
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obliged under some laws to provide certain administrative services requiring spending that is out
of their control. Unless such laws and relevant national policy measures are reviewed, local
governments will have difficulties adapting their spending to changing tax revenues. Another
factor behind the fast-increasing local government spending is the expansion of public works that
has forced local governments to spend more on interest payments on and redemptions of local
bonds and on maintenance and management of various facilities built under public works
projects. Certain constraints thus exist on the spending-saving efforts of local governments.
Therefore, a thorough review of national policies and expenditure must be coupled with local
governments' spending-saving efforts.
The present systems have made it difficult for local governments to hold down spending.
Eventually, both the national and local governments have been forced to expand spending and
become plagued with budget deficits.
2.4.3. Financial Resource Management
According to the current data, two-third of the total tax revenue are collected by the
national government and one-third of the total government expenditure are conducted by local
governments. An imbalance between the tax revenue and expenditure of the local governments
shows that there exist the large transfers of financial resources from the national government to
the local governments. Local governments receive these revenues so that a policy objective may
be accomplished. That revenue has become essential for most of local governments, except a few
that contain metropolitan areas in their jurisdiction. Though the revenues can be justified by
some reasons such as fiscal equalization among local governments and the redistribution of
income from higher-income taxpayers to those who by definition of their eligibility are lower-
income, it is also true that they invariably influence the fiscal status of local governments.
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The national government provides funds for local governments mainly as a government
subsidy and unspecified financial resources. The subsidy plays a main role of the central control
over local governments. The financial resource transfers from the national government to local
governments induce a gap between the benefit from local public services and local tax burdens
of inhabitants. Appropriate resource allocation is achieved when the benefit of public service
coincides with the burden. Thus, resource allocation may be distorted by the subsidy systems.
From Existing System to New System
Financial resources transfers from the national government to local ones take place
through national treasury disbursement (including subsidies), local allocation tax, special local
allocation subsidies, local transferred tax and other systems (see Figure 2-6). In the FY 2001
Local Financial Plan, the national government's financial resources transfers to local
governments amount to V34.9 trillion, accounting for 39.1% of total local government revenues
(Y89.3 trillion). The national government has thus been involved in spending at local
governments while securing financial resources for them. This system has played a great role in
the provision of administrative services in Japan. However, some problems with the financial
transfer system have become issues of controversy as below.
(1) The system has allowed local governments and residents to feel less responsible for
financial burdens and loosen their fiscal discipline. As a result, those who are
responsible for growing budget deficits at local governments have remained
unspecified.
(2) The system has tended to discourage local governments from making independent
decisions on their spending and revenues or from implementing measures that
respond flexibly to the needs of local residents.
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These problems for local governments could emerge for the national government that has issued
massive bonds to finance economic stimulus measures.
Revenue side
National Tax LocalTx
Financial transfers
+ through local allocaton +
National Government Local Government
bonds, etc. bonds, etc.
Spending side
National spending Local spending
Financial transfers through national
treasury disbursement, etc.
Figure 2-6 Financial Resource Transfer from National Government to Local Ones3
3 Sources include data from the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications
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2.5. Japan' s Public Finance as Seen from Stock Data
Table 2-1 Stock Data(FY1999) of Assets and Liabilities of Public Sector
(in trillion yen)
Public assets
General government Public corporations
National Local Social Public Public
government government security financial non-financialfund corporations corporations
Total assets 2,274.2 891.3 220.9 434.5 235.9 1,382.9 1,214.7 168.2
Financial assets 1,646.9 406.1 113.2 58.9 233.9 1,240.8 1,213.8 27.1
Non-financial 627.9 485.2 107.7 375.5 2.0 142.0 0.9 141.1
assetsI
Tangible 425.8 326.7 82.2 243.1 1.4 99.1 0.7 98.4fixed assets
Total liabilities 2,421.9 1,101.2 651.4 195.6 254.2 1,320.7 1,184.8 135.9
Outstanding 498.3 420.6 369.9 50.7 0.0 77.7 27.7 50.1public bonds
Retirement 52.6 46.6 12.6 33.9 0.1 6.0 0.2 5.7
allowance_______________________________
lnsiie 424.4 424.4 155.8 36.8 231.8 - - -
Net worth -147.7 -209.9 -430.5 238.9 -18.3 62.2 29.9 32.3
Notes: 1.Estimates by Cabinet Office
2.Outstanding public bonds are the total of government bonds,
municipal bonds, and securities of government-related corporations.
3.Total liabilities are based on the pension liabilities of case 3.
Table 2-1 indicates stock data at the end of FY 1999 as estimated by Cabinet Office.
Assets for the whole of the public sector total Y2,274 trillion (4.4 times as large as nominal GDP)
including Y1,647 trillion in financial assets and Y628 trillion in non-financial assets. Among
financial assets are Y649 trillion in loans (39% of financial assets) including Y553 trillion in loans
provided by public financial corporations (33%). Cash and deposits account for Y502 trillion
(30%) including Y437 trillion in deposits- at the Ministry of Finance Trust Fund Bureau. Of
non-financial assets, tangible fixed assets account for Y426 trillion (68%), mostly in social
infrastructure such as roads, water and sewage facilities, waste disposal facilities and others
owned by local governments.
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The public sector's liabilities aggregate V2,422 trillion. Their major components are
public financial corporations' cash and deposit liabilities worth Y791 trillion, outstanding
government bonds worth Y369 trillion and public financial corporations' borrowings worth Y343
trillion. As a result, net assets as the gap between assets and liabilities come to a negative Y148
trillion (amounting to 29% of nominal GDP).
2.5.1. National Government's Assets
The national government's outstanding assets at the end of FY 1999 total V221 trillion,
of which financial assets account for 51%. The national government's tangible fixed assets
aggregate Y82 trillion including roads, flood prevention facilities and air traffic facilities. Due to
the final payment principle as adopted for the SNA 4 as discussed earlier, the sum is much
smaller than tangible fixed assets of local governments. It is only one-third of the tangible fixed
asset value for local governments. The national government's liabilities total Y651 trillion, of
which public pension liabilities account for Y156 trillion and outstanding government bonds for
Y369 trillion.
2.5.2. Local Governments' Assets
Local governments own massive tangible fixed assets and land accounts for a major part
of their assets. Therefore, their outstanding assets total Y435 trillion, two times more than the
national government's. Local governments hold massive social infrastructure including roads,
flood prevention facilities, school and social education facilities, water and sewage facilities and
waste disposal facilities. On the other hand, local governments' liabilities aggregate Y196 trillion,
32
4 System of National Accounts
amounting to only 30% of the national governments'. They include borrowings (Y73 trillion),
local government bonds (V51 trillion), pension liabilities (Y37 trillion) and retirement allowance
liabilities (Y34 trillion). Local governments' net assets come to a positive Y239 trillion.
2.5.3. Asset and Social Stock Formation in the 1990s
Asset Formation
How much was asset formation in the 1990s? According to the SNA-adopted final
payment principle, the public sector as a whole increased tangible fixed assets by Y132 trillion
from Y294 trillion in FY 1990 to Y426 trillion in FY 1999.
Social Infrastructure Stock Formation
What tangible fixed assets did the public sector develop in the 1990s? Figure 1-7 shows
the characteristic of social infrastructure development in Japan during the 1990s. Contributing to
a 44.9% increase in tangible fixed assets between FY 1990 and 1990 were roads (18.5%), flood
prevention facilities (6.0%), sewage and waste disposal facilities (6.0%), airports (3.3%), school
and social education facilities (3.1%), and municipal and natural parks (2.4%) in the contribution
percentage order.
Shares of the increase (flow) in tangible fixed assets between FY 1990 and 1999 were
41.1% for roads, 7.4% for airports, 13.3% for sewage and waste disposal facilities, 13.3% for
flood prevention facilities, and 6.9% for school and social education facilities. In contrast, shares
of tangible fixed asset stock in FY 1990 were 29.8% for roads, 12.1% for flood prevention
facilities, 10.3% sewage and waste disposal facilities, and 4.1% for airports. These asset
categories' flow-base shares thus exceeded their respective stock-base shares. But school and
social education facilities' share of total tangible fixed assets was 9.3%, larger than their
flow-base share.
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In tangible fixed asset development in the 1990s, roads, airports, sewage and waste
disposal facilities, and flood prevention facilities scored relatively larger growth from their
respective shares of total stock in FY 1990, while a rise in school and social education facilities
was moderate.
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o Other tangible fixed
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E Harbors
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parks/natural parks
E_ School/social
i 30% educaton facilities
* Airports
C
0
20% -- Sew age and waste
disposal facilities
M Flood Preservation
10% Facilities
*Roads
0%
Public Sector General Central Local
Gov ernment Gov ernment Government
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Notes: Increases in social infrastructure between 1990 and 1999 and asset
components contributions to the increases.
Figure 2-7 Characteristics of Social Infrastructure Development in the 1990s5
2.5.4. Favorable relationship between the national and local governments
As discussed so far, Japan' s national and local public finance has been in a severe
situation and its improvement is urgently required. Various problems exist with administrative
and financial relations between the national and local governments. An overhaul of systems
connected with the relations between the national and local governments is required. Financial
5 Source; Estimated by the Cabinet Office.
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relations between the national and local governments contain a special feature. While local
governments mainly provide administrative services to the people, the national government is
involved in local government decisions through its regulations and subsidies and collects
financial resources for distribution to local governments. This system devitalizes local
governments to strive to independently promote regional development. Local governments tend
to believe that it is rational for them to beg for financial resources from the national government.
The system also leads inefficiency at the national government to cause inefficiency at local
governments. Local governments have been allowed to implement even ineffective projects.
Needs for administrative services by local governments are expected to steadily increase in
infrastructure, health care, and environmental areas in Japan in the future, as the birthrate
declines and the population ages and there is no high economic growth. Japan are now urgently
required to develop a new system to efficiently utilize limited financial and human resources to
meet new needs for administrative services.
Japan must seek its own approach within its cultural and political structure to devolving
finance and responsibility to local governments and private entities that are held accountable for
efficient use of resources through the interaction of public and market forces. The key to
successful realignment is likely to be in clarifying the role of the national government in public
works activities through three actions. Firstly, the national government has to allocate the
resources wisely on sectors that yield high benefits to the overall economy, and review the
present programs for development projects. Second, it has to establish new leadership roles in
defining overall objectives and standards to be carried out at the local level. And third, it needs to
strengthen the capacity of local authorities and the private sectors to implement efficient project
selection and delivery.
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Chapter 3. Japanese Construction Industry Overview
Construction investment in Japan has continued to decline since FY 1997.
It is estimated to hit V56.3 trillion for FY 2002, having fallen all the way to only 70%
of its 1992 peak. With a decline in public works projects, construction investment will
also inevitably decline over the next five years. Even over the mid- to long-term,
negative factors such as fiscal difficulty and the aging and shrinking of the population
will make it impossible to avoid further contraction.
Japanese public construction investment has been historically high level
compared to the other developed countries. This is because public works projects
were actively promoted in successive economic policies enacted to achieve economic
recovery. As a result of expansion of public investment over several years under the
economic slowdown, government fiscal conditions drastically worsened. In particular,
local governments found themselves in a difficult spot, and though the national
government had been promoting investment in public works to stimulate the economy,
it eventually became unable to follow through on these projects. Actually, the number
of independent local projects implemented by local governments with their own funds
continued to decrease over several years, and public projects funded by the national
government reached their limit. It has become difficult to rely on national government
finances to sustain construction investment. The Koizumi government has identified
public works structural reform as a high priority, but the underlying need for reform is
a more fundamental and long term one.
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This chapter first analyzes the historical and current trends in Japanese
construction industry and the pattern of public works spending in Japan. Secondary
this chapter discusses the issues of public investment for local infrastructure
development at the initiative of national government. Finally this chapter describes
the future prospects of construction market in Japan and discusses the importance of
vitalization of private sector investment in the Japanese construction industry.
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3.1. Long-term Trends in Japanese Construction Market
Figure 3-1 shows the amount of construction investment in Japan as the total of public
and private sector investment since 1960. After World War II, construction investment in Japan
had been drastically increased until 1973 and second wave has followed from 1985 to 1990 until
the burst of the babble economy. Historically, public sector investment has had a much lower rate
of annual amount than private sector investment. Since the 1980s, Japanese government had
responded to the continuing slump of private sector investment with an expansion in public
works investment. This traditional Keynesian approach has been continued until today as an
economic stimulus package with heavy emphasis on public works spending. According to the
figure, both of public and private investment for construction has been decreasing since 1997 and
it is likely to be in a gradual decline.
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Figure 3-1 Construction Investment in Japan: Public/Private
Figure 3-2 shows the amount of construction investment in Japan as the total amount of
investment for architecture (building) and civil works since 1960. In the latter half of the 1980s,
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the market of architectural projects had grown at a high pace compared to civil works because of
great bloom of private building construction market in the babble era. After 1990, the market has
followed a course of decline until today due to the burst of the babble economy. On the contrary,
the public investment for civil projects had steadily increased by issuing a huge amount of deficit
bonds to finance public works projects and caught up the declining amount of architectural work
in 1996. However, ever-worsening economy and enormously accumulated amount of bonds in
1997 has forced Japanese government to reduce the amount of public civil works. After 1997, in
spite of the government trials of new stimulus measures in a supplementary budget by issuing the
special bond, it didn't display effectiveness as a part of economic packages.
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Figure 3-2 Construction Investment in Japan: CiviU/Architecture
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3.2. Construction Investment Trends in Recent Years
Construction investment in Japan has continued to decline since fiscal 1997. Figure 3-3
shows the trends of GDP and total investment for construction including public and private
investment. It is estimated to settle at around $450 billion for fiscal 2002, having fallen all the
way to less than 70% of its 1993 peak of investment. Look at the percentage of budget
allocations for construction investment as a portion of GDP. Since 1996, it is clear the ratios have
downward tendency and the serious downdraft will be continued in 2003 based on the short-term
forecast.
6,000 30%
GDP Total Amount, billion $
Investment for Construction
5,000 - - -nvestment/GDP 25%
4,000 900 3938 4016 4122 4161 4106 4115 4104 4007 3954 3945 20%
1 8% 160% 1 7% 161%
3,000 '4}1139% 1 .3% 1 0% 15%12 1% 114% 11C0%
3 2,000 1 10%II-
1,000 553. 630.) 71 48 3. 3 . 5%
0 0%
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Notes: Construction investment values are calculated based on figures published by the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure and Transport up through fiscal 2001. Figures after fiscal 2002 are based
on estimates issued by Research Institute of Construction and Economy. Fiscal year basis.
Figure 3-3 GDP and Investment for Construction in Japan
The Figure 3-4 shows the trends in total construction investment (nominal values) since
fiscal year (FY) of 1986. Construction investment continued to expand after FY1986 until it
reached $701.7 billion in FY1991. After the bubble economy collapsed, investments declined but
remained at about the $600 billion level until FY1996. In FY1997, however, they dipped below
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$600 billion, and is likely to drop to $450 billion in FY2002 as shown in above figure. Though
private construction investment has been sluggish since the burst of the bubble economy, public
construction investment has remained at fairly high levels. This is because public works projects
were actively promoted in successive economic policies enacted to achieve economic recovery.
Since public works projects thus propped up construction investment, which had shrunk as a
result of major decreases in private construction, a rapid decline in overall construction
investment was averted. The figure also says the investment amounts of every category have
been decreasing gradually and the function to stimulate economy growth by increasing public
works is no more working.
00
700
00
0
0
Priv ate(Resident) M Private(Non-resident)
*Priv ate(Civ il work) Q Public(Resident)
WTo Public(Non-residnt) M Public(CiviI work)
00
00
00
00
00
CD N- c0 0) 0 N\ M Mt LO (0 N 00 0) 0 Cq00 OD oo cc 0) 0) 0 0) 0) 0) 0D 0) 0) 0) 0 0 0
0) 0) 0) 03) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0 0 0
Year
Figure 3-4 Trends in Construction Investment (Nominal Values)
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As a result of ongoing dynamic fiscal investment over several years in an environment
where the economic slowdown had produced a lack of financial resources, fiscal conditions
drastically worsened. Local governments especially found themselves in a difficult spot, and
though the national government had been promoting investment in public works projects to help
improve the economic climate, it eventually became unable to follow through on these projects.
Actually, the number of independent local projects implemented by local governments with their
own funds continued to decrease over several years, and public projects funded by the national
government reached their limit. It has become difficult to rely on national government finances
to sustain construction investment. Figure 3-5 shows the amount and percentage of local and
national project in total amount of public works. Local government spending is extremely
important in Japan and has accounted for over 70% of government consumption and investment.
However, because of the heavy reliance on national government aid, local governments are in
many ways merely agents for the national government. About 40% of all national government
expenditures are in the form of transfers to local governments. Because of counter-cyclical
macro economic polices being worked through capital programs, local government expenditures
and revenues tend to fluctuate based on national rather than local needs and priorities. Financial
sources of most projects remain dependent on national government's subsidies, as a result, local
government is not fully aware of its responsibility for own financial management and sometimes
turn over the responsibility to the national government.
Japanese national government has long time controlled local governments' economy by
adjusting the distribution of the subsidies in order to rectify such regional imbalances of revenue.
Hence, local governments haven't been able to manage their administration without the promised
subsidies from the national government. As the local government expenditures increase, the
national government subsidies to them are increased. This has created problems because while
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the stimulus packages have been diluted in their impacts, they have still resulted in the
government having large increases in debt that will be a burden on future budgets. It has a long
way for Japanese governments to reach the idea of "leave to local governments what can be done
by local governments." Besides, local bonds to pay for local infrastructure in Japan are not
subject to market discipline. Of the local government bonds (including those of local public
enterprises) some 60% are bought by public sector financial institutions through negotiation,
30% are negotiated with private banks, and only 10% are sold in the securities markets. In fact,
local bonds are seen as quasi-national government bonds. As a result, local governments have
virtually no autonomy in borrowing decisions and reduced reasons to take responsibility for their
affairs and to practice fiscal discipline. Low levels of local contributions to projects together with
a series of nationally mandated construction requirements make the capital items expensive and
reduce the incentives of local officials to economize. With large central transfers, the public does
not connect the pain of paying taxes and charges with the pleasure of consumption nor do they
hold officials accountable to efficient use of funds.
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Figure 3-5 Public Investment to National and Local Project
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Table 3-1 provides a time series breakdown of public works expenditures in Japan.
While there has been some increase in the amounts devoted to more productive sectors such as
highways, seaports and airports, there has not been the structural shift. For example in U.S.,
although highway outlays went up in absolute terms, they fell as a proportion of the public works
budget from 30.0% in 1980 to 29.6% in 2000. The expenditures in Japan on more socially
oriented sectors such as housing, agriculture, forestry and fisheries also rose throughout the
1980s and 1990s. Although there was a slight diminution in their relative overall importance in
the public works budget, this hardly represented a structural shift.
Table 3-1 Public Expenditure in Japan'
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Road improvement 1,910,806 1,826,000 2,176,876 2,262,402 2,494,703 2,685,023 2,684,337 2,776,674
Public transportation 9,841 9,000 8,659 17,163 81,923 100,812 91,963 117,500
Urban and main line railways - - - - 63,240 70,312 62,525 82,314
Bullet trains (Shinkansen) 
- - 7,100 16,607 18,683 30,500 29,438 35,186
Railway disaster prevention 9, 841 9, 000 1,559 556 - - - -
Ports 266,869 257,318 313,378 353,155 326,105 363,822 337,537 353,301
Airports 97,420 92,740 102,479 108,668 122,808 141,434 143,937 170,595
Housing 754,323 757,721 844,109 895,621 1,053,623 1,161,288 1,016,130 1,073,812
Sewer 680,958 677,895 825,782 880,753 1,050,448 1,171,946 1,112,109 1,131,503
Afforestation and flood control 1,104,298 1,082,611 1,318,260 1,412,744 1,523,944 1,589,252 1,399,169 1,491,958
Flood control 861,710 842,550 1,029,595 1,106,216 1,193,496 1,274,362 1,112,108 1,200,571
Afforestation 161,908 161,325 195,666 208,346 223,577 201,444 184,021 187,404
Seacoasts 80,680 78,736 92,999 98,182 106,871 113,446 103,040 103,983
Agriculture & fisheries 1,081,848 1,061,765 1,242,338 1,323,331 1,412,939 1,479,553 1,312,043 1,324,077
Agriculture & farming community improvement 897,473 878,917 1,026,393 1,093,445 1,168,180 1,227,910 1,083,653 1,092,607
Fishery ports 164,055 161,790 190,673 202,553 214,952 219,473 198,390 200,923
Coastal fishing zone improvement 20,320 21,058 25,272 27,333 29,807 32,170 30,000 30,547
Forests 123,617 120,592 139,183 148,240 168,373 223,450 198,767 203,469
Forest conservation improvement 123,617 120,592 139,183 148,240 168,373 197,118 171,763 175,238
Forest environment improvement (a) - - - - - 26,332 27,004 28,231
Other 325,100 321,998 406,924 442,002 551,912 633,564 621,666 715,139
Navigational aids - - - - 7,870 7,963 7,221 7,329
Urban district improvement - - - 47,296 55,679 52,182 107,887
Environment and health 190,622 190,097 222,473 244,611 305,486 361,169 345,923 363,695
Small water supply systems - - 2,817 - - - -
Industrial water 22,563 16,405 18,682 19,496 20,346 15,404 11,978 11,872
City parks 94,907 102,274 151,435 162,483 147,837 166,069 157,455 168,769
Natural parks (b) - - - - 8,948 11,642 12,935 17,586
Electricity for isolated islands 3,931 2,516 2,671 21 21 21 19 0
Adjustment expenses, etc. 13,077 10,706 11,663 12,574 14,108 15,617 33,953 38,001
General public works expenses total 6,355,080 6,207,640 7,377,988 7,817,029 8,813,828 9,550,144 8,917,658 9,358,028
Notes: (a) From 1997, reorganized as 'Forest conservation improvement' or 'Forest environment improvement' depending on the
objective of forest improvement; accordingly, previous values represent the total of "afforestation projects" and 'forest
road projects'; (b) No category for city parks and natural parks for 1980,1985, 1991 and 1992;
1 Source: Fiscal Investigation Bureau (2000)
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In Japanese construction industry, general contractors, over 5 millions of companies at
present, had played a significant role in the land development since the 1960s. What is called,
"big 5 general contractors" have their own project management know-how and innovative
technology in the construction field. They sometimes take over the public sector's responsibility
particularly in local project. They order the public works to the bigger contractors in order to
reduce potential risks and responsibilities by throwing them to the contractors with some margin
of profit. Figure 3-6 shows the sales of Japanese 65 main contractors. Though the sales amount
of major contractors is declining in the past decade, the percentage of sales to the total amount is
still in high level. This tendency is likely to continue in the future. In this sense, on the one hand,
the idea of "use private sector resources wherever possible" has been already carried out, but on
the other hand, the idea of "leave to local governments what can be done by local governments"
has not been realized in Japan so far. Management of excessive risks and responsibilities by
private sectors creates waste of time and money in public works.
Investment for Construction
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Figure 3-6 Sales of Japanese 65 Main Contractors
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3.3. Future Forecast of Japanese Construction Market
20-year forecast
Construction investment as a whole will decrease as investment in each sub-sector is
scaled down. Figure 3-7 shows the every 5-year forecast of Japanese construction market until
22020 . Left figure shows the amount of each investment and right figure shows the percentage of
each investment to the total investment amount.
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Figure 3-7 20 Year Forecast of Japanese Construction Market
The market size will shrink from $554 billion in FY2000 to $505 billion in FY2010
assuming 2.0% of the economic growth and 0% growth of construction investment during the
decade. It is also estimated $502 billion in FY2020 assuming 2.5% of the economic growth and
0% growth of construction investment during the decade from 2010. In this case, the growth of
public investment is a little optimistically assumed as 0%. This estimation doesn't include the
cumulatively increasing repair and maintenance works, which is discussed in Chapter 7.
Accordingly, actual number is likely to be lower than the case.
2 Source: Research Institute of Construction and Economy
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Infrastructure Development and Asset Management in Japan
Figure 3-8 shows the current status of infrastructure development in major countries.
Infrastructure development in Japan has not reached to the world-class standard. In particular,
not only development of transportation infrastructure including highway network and railway
double-decking, but also development of environment-related projects including laying work of
power lines and building of public parks is woefully behind major countries in the world. On the
other hand, Japan is facing issue of social stock management in the near future. Enormous
amount of social capital stocks constructed during post-war high-growth period of the Japanese
economy.
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Figure 3-8 Infrastructure in Major Countries
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Figure 3-9 shows accumulated amount of social capital stock and its growth rate in
Japan. Most of the infrastructure stock constructed from the 1960s to the 1980s are expiring its
service life. They need maintenance or reconstruction for safety reasons. The total cost for
continuing maintenance, repairing or reconstruction of those accumulated social stocks will
become huge amount.
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Figure 3-9 Social Capital Stock in Japan
For instance, there are 1.36 millions of bridges in Japan. In those bridges, over 4,000
bridges were past their service life and it will increase to over 14,000 bridges in 2010. In 2020, it
becomes over 43,000 bridges which come to the end of its service life.
Figure 3-10 shows the number of bridges constructed since 1920. According to the
figure, the peak of bridge construction is in the 1970s. These enormous maintenance, repair and
reconstruction cost must burden on Japanese economy. In the near future, the national
government has to respond to social and economic needs with considering constraints on public
financial resources. Therefore, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is trying to
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introduce the private financing for "asset management" in Japanese construction industry based
on the experience in the U.S. and the U.K.
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Figure 3-10 Bridge Construction in Japan
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3.4. Construction Market and Private Financing
Japanese construction industry was worth around $451 billion annually in 2002,
representing approximately 11.7% of Japan's GDP. Against the current economic background of
rapid change and deregulation, Japan has tried to abandon its traditional "scrap and build"
approach to construction, which left few structures over 50 years old, in favor of an approach in
which repairing and maintenance are considered options. This new approach requires a different
mix of skills, technologies and products as the U.K. is particularly well placed to provide it.
Besides, as describes so far, infrastructure development in Japan has lag significantly behind
Europe and the U.S. In the critical public fiscal condition, "long-life" or "maintenance-free"
structures are required in Japanese infrastructure development.
On the other hand, Japanese national government has to review the public investment
and establish its own approach to devolve their political and financial responsibility to local
governments in order to downsize the government. Every local government has its original
characteristic both historically and geographically. Therefore, local government basically has to
take responsibilities for their own infrastructure development and it needs to function in harmony
with the social environment. It must be the way to realize the effective use of resources and
maximize its benefit to the tax payers. Besides, by introducing private finance scheme and
market force, the local government can expand the range of choices and reduce the cost for
public investment.
However, local government has to learn from the fact that the previous trials of private
financing ended in complete failure, and promote the public investment without repeating past
failures such as the case in "Third Sector." There is no more national megaproject in Japan and
the tendency is toward downscaling of future projects. The national government will lose its
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control of managing all public works in local governments' charge. It is the time for every local
government to express administrative and political leadership in order to achieve a true
decentralization of power.
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Chapter 4. Private Finance Initiative
for Infrastructure Procurement
In order to stimulate infrastructure investment, public authorities seek to
involve the private sector in the provision of new infrastructures. The main purpose of
the privatization is not only to overcome the government financial difficulties by
assumption of the payment, but also to supply a higher value of service to the
customers (users) by establishing a new public-private partnership. However, in the
1980s the Japanese national government made a terrible mistake in application of the
private finance scheme for infrastructure development. The "Third Sector (Joint
public-private venture)" changed the previous structure of the Japanese construction
industry and brought the government's finances into a serious crisis. The government
is required to make a fundamental reform of regulations and systems in order to make
effective use of taxes. As a potential solution of financial crisis, PFI is being focused
in global industrial market, and the effect is still unclear even in its birthplace, the U.K.
The U.K. government is still exploring the potential of PFI.
This chapter describes principle and important key components to
implement PFI for infrastructure development. Firstly, it explains the origin and
definition of PFI which was developed as one of the Public Private Partnerships (PPP)
based on "the New Public Management (NPM) Theory." Secondary, the main
concepts and implementation phase are shown for comprehensive understanding of
the current PFI system. Finally, it discusses the government roles in the effective
application of PFI.
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4.1. What is PPPIPFI?
The idea of Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) was born in the United Kingdom under
the Thatcher government in 1980s. It was originally based on "The New Public Management
(NPM) Theory" which was one of the new policies advocated by Thatcher to lead to less
intervention by the government, a more liberated government, reduced taxation, improved public
sector efficiency and effectiveness, greater public service responsiveness and accountability to
consumers and citizens. PPP was also intended to lead to increased choice between public and
private providers of public services to stimulate the private sector and to provide better national
economic performance. PPP is a progressive form of NPM theory and is still in the process of
evolution.
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is one of the schemes, in 1992, that was introduced
in the U.K. to privatize certain social infrastructure and public services as deemed appropriate
and beneficial to taxpayers, with the objective of promoting a smaller and more efficient
government. The Thatcher administration supported the idea of a leaner, smaller government to
overcome economic stagnation that has been occurring since the 1960s, ever-growing
government deficits, and expanded government. The Major administration continued the policies
of downsizing the public sector, deregulating, and introducing market principles into public
services, and went a step further by reorganizing government functions into agencies, and
promoting market testing, in which the private sectors compete with public services. The
underlying objective of these policies is to shift the paradigm of government from public
administration to public management. PFI is an extension of this policy trend. For PFI, whose
real aim is administrative reform, PPP is the means to transfer much of the public sector's role to
the private sector. According to HM Treasury in the U.K., the definition of PFI is:
"the public sector contracts to purchase quality services, with defined outputs, on a
long-term basis from the private sector, and including maintaining or constructing the
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necessary infrastructure. The term also covers financially free-standing projects (e.g.
the Second Severn Bridge) where the private sector supplier designs, builds, finances
and then operates an asset and covers the costs entirely through direct charges on the
private users of the asset, with public sector involvement limited to enabling the
project to go ahead through assistance with planning, licensing and other statutory
procedures."
Under the most common form of PFI, the private sector Designs, Builds, Finances and
Operates (DBFO) facilities based on 'output' specifications decided by public sector managers
and their departments. Such projects need to achieve a genuine transfer of risk to the private
sector contractor to secure value for money in the use of public resources before they will be
agreed upon. The private sector already builds most public facilities but PFI also enables the
design, financing and operation of public services to be carried out by the private sector. Under
the PFI, the public sector does not own an asset, such as a hospital or school but pays the PFI
contractor a stream of committed revenue payments for the use of the facilities over the contract
period. Once the contract has expired, ownership of the asset either remains with the private
sector contractor, or is returned to the public sector, depending on the terms of the original
contract.
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4.2. Objectives of PPP
The idea of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) has been developed and spread by
government based on the NPM theory in the U.K. For achieving the best performance of the
public and private sectors, the key element of each partnership arrangement is not whether it is
classified to the public sector or to the private sector. Instead, what matters is whether it provides
the structure most likely to deliver the Government's objectives.
The Government develops PPP's with three broad objectives in mind:
(1) to deliver significantly improved public services by contributing to increases in the quality
and quantity of investment;
(2) to release the full potential of public sector assets including state-owned businesses, and
hence provide value for the taxpayer and wider benefits for the economy;
(3) to allow stakeholders to receive a fair share of the benefits of the PPP. This includes
customers and users of the service being provided to the taxpayer and employees at every
level of the organization.
In the U.K., by promoting PPP, the government has tried to invest for modern, quality
public services. A key priority for this Government is to increase investment in public services
after many years in which the public sector asset stock was allowed to deteriorate. The
government sets out details of departments' plans for using this additional investment, and how
these plans link to their overall objectives. It also outlines the procedures and systems that will
ensure that value for money is obtained. Central to the Government 's approach is to use PPP
where they provide better value compared to public sector investment. Under PPP, the public
sector specifies the outputs required from the investment, but the responsibility for, and many
risks associated with, delivering those outputs is transferred to the private sector partner. This can
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offer better services, delivered more efficiently and provide better value for money for the
taxpayer than public sector investment, provided the outputs can be clearly specified from the
outset and that both parties fully understand the risks they are taking on. In addition, PPP
encourage innovative approaches, as the private sector partner is given flexibility over the design
of the assets and operational procedures.
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4.3. Basic Concepts of PFI
PFI is based on the following clearly defined concepts.
1) Public and private sector's role
The public sector, which has been a provider of public services, becomes a purchaser of
appropriate services through PFI. On the other hand, the private sector's role is to supply services
created through the management of facilities.
2) PFI is applicable to various public activities
Various public operations and services are eligible for PFI. Conventional public
investment is applicable only for activities in which PFI cannot be efficiently implemented. Table
4-1 shows the example of public works by PFI.
Table 4-1 Various public activities by PFI
Field Type of Business
Transportation Highway, Surface Transport, bridge, Railway, Underground,
Public welfare Hospital, Nursing and personal care facility
Culture & Education School, Student accommodation, Museum, Gymnasium
Government and public Government office building, prison, Court, Police office, Fire station
off ice______________________________
Information Information systems, Automation of office counter work
Defense Office building, Training system, School
Other infrastructure Garbage collection, Urban development, Water work, Public housing
3) Value for money (VFM)
One of the ultimate goals of PFI is to deliver services that can offer the best value to
taxpayers. Public expenditures must always be considered to satisfy the VFM requirement. Basic
concept of VFM can be shown as Figure 4-1. Firstly, public sectors estimate expected VFM by
comparing the project cost in case of PFI to the cost in case of traditional way (Public Sector
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Comparator). The project implementation is depends on this feasibility study. This means the
calculation and evaluation of VFM is required from the project planning stage and the result is
the absolute key component of success in the project management. Because in case the result of
this expected VMF is lower than true value, which means the VMF is underestimated, the project
doesn't look like an attractive place to invest for the public sector and it throws away a precious
opportunities. On the contrary, in case the result of this expected VMF is higher than true value,
which means the VMF is overestimated, the project doesn't look like an attractive place to invest
for the private sectors and it weakens their rivalry to win a bid for the project. As a result,
effective implementation of PFI cannot be achieved.
Project risks
Value Added Tax VFM
Property Tax
Corporate Tax
Profit of private company
Interest for Payment Project risks
Operational Cost 
Interest for Payment
Operatioal Costp_ rat___ na___C ___
Construction Cost - O
Construction Cost
Figure 4-1 Value For Money
4) Market testing
In order to improve the quality of public services by PFI, the public sector needs to
compete with the private sector. Under the VFM approach, if the private sector can deliver a
public service more efficiently than the public sector, that service has to be privatized. The initial
estimation of project VFM by public sectors is significantly important process in the
58
implementation of private financing scheme. If the public sector has enough experiences and
abilities to evaluate the project, private sectors can be given the chance to participate in PFI. As
the accuracy of VFM is improved, the benefit from the PFI project is likely to increase.
5) Full disclosure
Contracts stipulate that information on bidding and contract conditions are not to be
disclosed if they are not against the public interest. However, public terms regarding the
contractor selection process, progress of projects, and so forth are disclosed as a rule. For
example, in the process of disclosure, the government has to show the detail of the project
evaluation including bidding price or VFM etc. Moreover, under disclosure guidelines, it is
possible to petition the parliamentary ombudsman to have information disclosed by going
through proper channels after an internal examination by the administration.
6) Risk Transfer from public sector to private one
With the PFI, value for money is achieved through the transfer of risk to the private
sector, which is perceived to have an advantage in handling risk. Figure 4-2 shows the
relationship between VFM and transferring of risks. Based on the VFM approach, the method
and extent of transferring risk to the private sector need to be examined. Transferring all risk to
the private sector produces an imbalance from the viewpoint of the public sector. Since private
contractors who bear all the risks will charge higher prices, it is not the best VFM solution. In
general, VMF can be maximized by transferring appropriate amount of risk in between public
and private sectors.
59
VFM
Optimal VFM
Optimal Point Amount of Transferred Risk
Figure 4-2 VFM and Risk Transferring
The risks that can be transferred to the private sector can be divided into two groups,
general risks that are common all types of public/private service projects and PFI specific risks
that are PFI public services project specific. Risks come in many forms and often depend on the
characteristics of a particular project. The risks involved in providing a playground for a school
are sure to differ in some aspects from the risks associated with a large-scale transport project.
The transfer of risk differs with PFI public services contracts in that it enables the transfer of
project financing risk to the private sector. Therefore, an essential condition of any PFI project is
that adequate amount of financial risk is transferred to the private sector to secure value for
money.
According to the private report, public services project financing risk, the risk of
delivering an economically viable financial package, can be divided into two main types, internal
disposal risk and external financing risks. Disposal risk is the risk that the expected value of
surplus government assets, detailed for disposal in a PFI contract to fund public services, is
lower than expected. Governments can reduce their exposure to this risk by transferring assets,
such as redundant hospital buildings and grounds, which have, or are to become, surplus to
requirement to the private sector contractor as part of the PFI contract. External financing risk is
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the risk that the private sector contractor fails to raise sufficient funding for a public services
project on the market. As with any contract, the ability of the private sector contractor to secure
the finance required to complete a PFI project, must be determined by the sponsoring
government before the deal is signed. External financing risks are also related to interest rate
risk, which is the risk that the interest rate will change between the time a bid is tendered and the
time a contract is signed. In the BTO project, because the ownership is transferred to the public
sector after construction of facilities, some of the risk is owned by a public sector. Adverse
movements in the interest rate during this time mean that the private sector contractor has to pay
more to service their debt, which may reduce the attractiveness of a PFI contract.
The transfer of project financing risk generates incentives for the private sector to
supply services on time and of a higher quality as they only start to receive service payments
when a flow of public services actually starts, and continued payment depends on meeting
specified performance criteria. A further effect of transferring a project's financing risk to the
private sector is that it reduces the general risks of public service projects that have been retained
by the public sector. However, since risks and benefits go hand in hand, the higher the perceived
risk transferred to the private sector, the greater the risk premium. Given that some risks are
difficult to quantify it is difficult to allocate all the risks adequately to either party for accepting a
particular risk. Both sectors should not forget the principle, "risk should be allocated to whoever
is best able to manage it" and transfer for its own sake. The risks of a public services project
should only be transferred to the private sector if, and to the extent that, the private sector is
capable of managing such risk. In situations where the private sector is best judged able to deal
with risk, such as construction risk, then the public sector should try and transfer this
responsibility completely. Where the private sector is deemed less able to manage project risk,
responsibility for these risks should remain within the public sector.
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4.4. Types of PFI
The structure of PFI is divided mainly following three types depending on the
government intervention or fare collecting systems. Table 4-2 shows these three PFI alternatives
in U.K. experience depending on the characteristics of the project.
1) Services sold to the public sector
This type is the ideal form of PFI in which the private contractor builds and operates a
facility, and recovers its investment by selling services to the public sector. However, simple
finance leases of facilities are not included. It has a track record in delivering public services
such as hospitals, prisons, roads, and information systems.
Payment for service Piae Service Provision -SrieUeSponsor -- - - -PPiae - -- - - _S rieU e
Government Company (Consumer)IqContract P
2) Financially free-standing projects
Here the private contractor builds and operates a facility under license from the
government. Like toll roads and toll bridges, the investment is recovered through fee revenues,
and public expenditures are not involved in principle. BOT (build, operate, transfer) projects
commonly seen in Southeast Asia are of this type.
Delegation
of rights Service Provision
Sponsor --- - - Private Service User
Government Company (Consumer)
Payment for service
3) Joint Ventures
While both public and private sectors provide funding to build facilities, operations are
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man-aged by the private sector. Since the investment cannot easily be recovered from
operating profit, the project often depends on value enhancement from redevelopment or
railroad construction projects. In this type of PFI, effective support from the public sector is
allowed. However, usually the support comes not as operating subsidies, but rather is limited
to contributions for acquiring and using assets for the development.
Contract Service ProvisionSponsor Private Service User
Government Company (Consumer)
Subsidies Payment for service
Table 4-2 Classification of PFI in the U.K.
Type of PFI Main Role of Public Sector Main role of Private Sector Type of Infrastructure
Services sold to Project planning and Design,Construction,Operation, Hospital, Prison, School,
the public sector payment for service Maintenance and Financing Road, etc.
Financially free- Project planning and Design,Construction,Operation, Urban development,
standing projects Investment to SPC Fin ancshrtfall of public financing) Surface transport, etc.
Joint-venture Project planning Design,Construction, Operation, Highway, Museum, etc.Maintenance and Financing
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4.5. Implementation Process
In the U.K., the birthplace of the scheme, there has been well-established system of PFI.
The present Japanese PFI has copied U.K. style of PFI application.
1) PFI project supervision
In the beginning, a Private Finance Committee was established outside the Treasury to
act as coordinator for central agencies, local public entities, and private contractors. However,
it had no power. To further promote PFI, the Blair administration established the PFI Task
Force (TF) within the Treasury with the power of approval, support, and coordination for PFI.
The TF is composed of a Project Team of nine experts from the private sector including the
head, and a Policy Team of Treasury personnel. The Project Team is responsible for
determining feasibility and approving PFI projects. The Policy Team is in charge of rules for
PFI projects, procedural matters, and coordinating across agencies.
2) PFI project organization
Each PFI department in a public sector office plays the lead role in establishing business
needs and moving the project forward. Through the Project Team, the TF supports each
department, approves the project, and coordinates participants. Ultimate responsibility for the
project rests with each department. A major role is also played by the National Audit Office
(NAO). It is an independent office that conducts financial audits and VFM audits, and reports
directly to the Public Accounts Commit-tee of the House of Commons.
3) PFI procurement process
Figure 4-3 shows the general implementation process for PFI projects consists of 14
stages. In the preparatory stages, business needs are addressed (Stage-1), and realistic
alternatives for meeting these needs are identified and assessed for their efficiency and
effectiveness (Stage-2). If PFI is found to be the best method for procurement, an outline
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business case is prepared covering specific business plans, risk analysis and budget
constraints (Stage-3). At this stage, market sounding is used to determine the level of interest
among private contractors and the public. Entering the bidding stages, a project team of
experts is formed (Stage-4). Consequently, the team decides the tactics for selection stages
and the selection process is formulated (Stage-5). Furthermore, a call for competition is
issued with a sufficient explanation of the project. Interest parties are provided further details
of the projects (Stage-6). Bidders are screened in a pre-qualification process and a long list is
compiled (Stage 7). In the selection stages, the long list of bidders is reduced to a short list
(Stage-8), and at the same time the original appraisal of business needs is refined (Stage-9).
An invitation to negotiate is then offered to bidders giving them detailed information to use in
formulating their bids (Stage-10). After bids are received, discussions are conducted with
each bidder to clarify and evaluate their proposal (Stage-11), and negotiations are aimed at
ensuring that requirements are met and defining terms of the contract, and bidders are then
asked to submit their best and final offer. Based on the offer, plans are reviewed one more
time to confirm that the objectives can be achieved (Stage-12). If there are no problems, the
contract is awarded and a notice is publicized (Stage-13). The management of the contract
defines the working relationship between the public sector client and PFI service provider
(Stage-14). While this is a brief description of the procurement process, the PFI guidelines
contain detailed information on implementation procedures, including a standard contract
form. These guidelines with training and development programs have been prepared for local
governments implementing PFI.
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Clarify objectives by establishing business need
Produce outline business case and outline PSC
Appraise the options (Feasibility Study)
Assemble project team
Decide tactics for selection stage
Invite bids by issuing contract notice
Prequalification of bidders
Selection of bidders (listing up)
Reappraise business case and refine the PSC
Invitation to negotiate
Receipt and evaluation of bids
Selection of preferred bidder and final evaluation
Award contract and financial close
Manage contract
Figure 4-3 Guide to the PFI Process
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4.6. Procurement Scheme of PFI
Table 4-3 shows the procurement business schemes in PFI. Listed are the basic schemes
and there can be some hybrid types applied to the actual PFI projects. In the U.K., the DBFO
(Design-Build-Finance-Operate) model is also one of the major schemes for infrastructure
development by the private finance. On the selection of PFI schemes, transferring of ownership
has close correlation with risk management. The earlier the asset transfers from the private sector
to the public sector, the more the amount of risk belonging to the private sector becomes. Under
the BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) model, since the asset is transferred after the operation of the
facility, the operation risk, including maintenance risk, is not to be transferred during the
operation period and the risk is managed by the private sector. On the contrary, under the BTO
(Build-Transfer-Operate) model, since the asset is transferred before the operation of the facility,
the operation risk is managed by public sector during the operation period. In the sense that the
operation risk can be ignored for the private sector under the BTO model, BOT model is riskier
for it and includes high risk premium. As for BOO (Build-Own-Operate), there is no transferring
of operation risk in the process of project implementation, hence, the operation risk and disposal
risk is to be burden on the private sector and the risk premium is expected to be higher than the
case under the BOT or BTO model.
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Table 4-3 PFI Scheme
System Feature Ownership Finance Source Operation of the Collection of
for Construction Facility Project Fund
* 
I
SPC has no operational department in the organization and builds the
facilities. Ownership is to be transferred to the government after lease
period. The facilities are to be operated by government and SPC redeem
capital invested by the lease fee. Though the system brings expected cost
reduction, it does not help to streamline administrative structure.
Private
To
Government
(after lease period)
Private Government
BOT SPC performs design, construction and operation of the facilities. At the
Build- end of operation period (20-30 years) operation of the facilities is Private Private Services sold
Operate- transferred to the government for free. Initially, the system was applied for To PrivateTo Or
Transfer the infrastructure project in developing countries. It helps to bring Government Government Joint venture
expected cost reduction. (after contract period) (after lease period)
BOS SP- performs design construction and operation of the facilities. At the
Build- end of operation period (20-30 years) operation of the facilities is Private Private Services sold
Operate- transferred to the government for value. It helps to bring expected cost oPrivate To OrSell reduction. Government Piae Government Jinvntr(after contract period) (after lease period) Joint venture
BTO Soon after SPC builds the facilities, the ownership is transferred to the Private
Build-Transfer government. SPC obtain the right of the use of the facilities and redeems To Services sold
-Operate capital invested by its operation. SPC can avoid the owner's responsibility Government Private Private Or
and risk of holding facilities. The system brings expected cost reduction (after completion of Joint venture
and helps to streamline administrative structure. facility construction)
BSO Soon after SPC builds the facilities, the ownership is sold by SPC to the Private
Build-Sell- government on installment payment. SPC redeems capital invested by the TO Services sold
Operate payment. SPC can avoid the owner's responsibility and risk of holding o Private Private Or
facilities. The system brings expected cost reduction and helps to Gaerne Joint venture
streamline administrative structure.
BOO SPC performs design, construction and operation of the facilities. SPC
Build-Own- continues to operate it and the ownership is not transferred to the
Operate government. The capital invested is to be redeemed by payments of its Private Private Private Joint venture
end user. The system brings expected cost reduction and helps to
streamline administrative structure.
------------------------------------------------ 
--------- ----------DIu
Build-Finance-
Operate
5Id performs design, construction and operation of the facilities. SPC
continues to operate it and the ownership is not transferred to the
government. The capital invested is to be redeemed by payments of the
government with consignment contract. The system brings expected cost
reduction and helps to streamline administrative structure.
Private Private Private Joint venture
*SPC; Special Purpose Company
BLI
Build-
Lease-
Transfer
00
a)
ZI
0
C:
E
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0)
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4.7. Government Roles and Intervention
For the provision of infrastructure service, government intervention can take different
forms depends on the characteristics of projects. Compared to the initial forms of government
intervention, financial interventions by the government are quite limited. Moreover, nowadays,
the project company will not normally gain ownership of the land in the form of either leasehold
or ownership rights, but will simply be granted some forms of restrictive license to use the land
specifically for the project during the operating period. The present forms of government
intervention in the U.K. experience are the following:
(1) the granting of exclusive rights protecting the project company from the competition of
alternative infrastructure
(2) the insurance of a minimal revenue during the operation phase through "take-or-pay" or
"take-and-pay" contract
(3) the construction of complementary assets to the infrastructure allowing to improve the
access to this infrastructure (e.g. the development of railway and road infrastructure to
Eurotunnel)
(4) the internalization of the positive externalities generates by the project through land or
equipment granting and contribution of actors benefiting from the development of the
infrastructure (e.g. participation of property developers, landowners and shopkeepers to the
development of the Bristol Light Rail project in recognition of increase in land values along
the railway's route)
(5) indirect financial aid through, for instance, tax holidays or interest bonus (e.g. subordinated
loan provided by the Malaysian government to develop the North-South Highway that could
be drawn if the project revenues fell below a projected target level)
(6) the transfer of revenues from an existing infrastructure to ensure the financing of a new
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project during the construction period (e.g. the transfer of the revenue from two existing
tunnels crossing the Thames to reduce the debt period during the construction and early
operational phase for the development of the new Dartford Bridge).
Even if the provision of government guarantees can be justified by the existence of positive
externalities or the lower cost of capital incurred by the public sector, the government
intervention might have adverse effects. First, it reduces the incentives for banks or private
investors to screen projects carefully. Second, guarantees blunt managerial efficiency in
particular when the government guarantees against cost overruns. Finally, guarantees create
contingent liabilities for the government which do not appear in the budget. The type of
government intervention is crucial in order not to distort the incentive of each stakeholder active
in the project. For instance, direct subsidies may be better than guarantees since they run through
the normal budgetary process and may be limited to an amount just large enough to make the
project attractive to private investors. However, political pressures may lead to inefficient
subsidies compared to the social benefit of the project.
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Chapter 5. Private Finance Initiative in the U.K.
Private financing has been used for the development of important
infrastructure in Europe. In the U.K., the government has introduced the Private
Finance Initiative (PFI) in 1992 Autumn Statement in order to promote the
construction of new infrastructure. The participation of the private sector in
infrastructure projects has surely led to the creation of a new industrial structure in the
U.K. and it proposed a future ideal relationship between public and private sectors.
However, it is also the fact that there is no project which is near the termination of the
concession contract so that it is very difficult to evaluate its efficiency at present.
Against such a background, this chapter first studies a current PFI market
situation in the U.K. as a pioneer country of private financing to develop
infrastructure. And it secondary describes the features of PFI application in the U.K.
construction market introducing typical PFI projects. Finally, summary of this chapter
discusses some current issues of the U.K. version of PFI.
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5.1. The U.K. Construction Market Overview
The U.K. construction industry contributes around 8% of GDP and employs about 2
million people. The U.K. construction output is 12% of total European output, has the 3rd largest
construction output in Europe and is the 5th largest in the world. In 2000, the U.K. construction
industry's output was £69.5 billion at current prices, up from £55.2 billion in 1996. It is of major
importance to the U.K. economy, accounting for 7.4% of the U.K. gross domestic product (GDP)
in 2000. As well as its economic significance, the construction industry is also a major employer.
As Japanese construction market, the majority of private contracting firms employ fewer than
four people, but in terms of the value of work done, the industry is dominated by a small number
of large companies. In 2000, infrastructure accounted for 9.2% of all construction work, a
slightly lower figure than for the previous 4 years, and was worth £6.4 billion. Road construction
is the main source of work, with the Government's 10-Year Transport Plan giving a boost to
expenditure. Gas, air and communications formed the next most significant market. Water and
sewerage activities continue to be a major source of work, largely as a result of determinations
by the water industry regulator. A major upturn can be expected in the railway industry as a
result of recent accidents.
A government-initiated quality scheme to provide customer assurance got off to a very
slow start. A major challenge is the lack of skilled labor throughout the industry. Some
companies consider that this is serious enough to be a limiting factor in their business
development. The U.K. has a tradition of high home ownership, which, coupled with an old
housing stock, means that repair and maintenance work is an important part of the construction
industry. With the increase in Public Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes, the boundary between
public and private sector work is becoming less distinct.
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5.2. The Scope of PFI Projects in the U.K.
To overcome economic stagnation since 1960s, Thatcher administration decided to
downsize the central government and seek efficiency to the development of infrastructure. The
"smaller government policy" was continued by downsizing public sectors, deregulating financial
operations and introducing market principles into public service, and made a step by
reorganizing government functions into agencies, introducing the Citizen's Charter, and
promoting market testing, in which the private sector competes the public services.
The PFI has meant that more capital projects have been undertaken for a given level of
public expenditure and public service capital projects have been brought on stream earlier. As at
1 September 2001 there had been almost 450 PFI deals signed with a total capital value of £20
billion. The increased level of activity must be paid for by higher public expenditure in the future,
as the stream of payments to the private sector grows. PFI projects signed to date have
committed the Government to a stream of revenue payments to private sector contractors
between 2000/01 and 2025/26 of almost £100 billion.
5.2.1. PFI Market Size in the U.K.
Figure 5-1 sets up the number of contracts and annual amount of PFI projects since the
PFI was started in the U.K. According to the figure, the number of contracts has been gradually
increased since 1992 in which PFI was started, and annual project amount has also increased
except from the case in 1996. The highest amount was spent in the year of 1996 because of the
Channel Tunnel Rail Link Project (CTRL) which is the amount of £4.2 billion and the biggest
PFI project in the U.K. until now. The number of projects has been steadily increasing every year
and the trend is assumed to continue in the U.K. for some time in the future.
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Figure 5-1 Annual Contract Amount and the Number of Contracts
5.2.2. Type of Projects
Table 5-1 shows that by 1 September 2001 there had been almost 450 PFI project
contracts signed with a total value of just over E20 billion, 40% of which has been accounted for
by the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR). From the early
stage, the U.K. government tried to apply PFI scheme to the infrastructure development. For
example, The Highways Agency (HA), an executive agency of the Department of Transport, has
undertaken four road projects under DBFO scheme:
- the MI-Al link road near Leeds
- the A 1(M) widening between Alconburgand Peterborough
- the A419/A417 between Swinden and Gloucester
- the A69 between Carlisle and Newcastle-Upon-Tyne.
In such road projects, the asset is provide by the private sector, the provider retains ownership
and contracts to supply free entry to traffic for a pre-specified period of 30 years. The provider is
remunerated directly from the government, not the user, in the form of a fixed fee per vehicle
(shadow tolls), which is monitored at various points on the road. The government pays directly
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for the use of the service by the public, rather than for the provision of road services. The
Department of Health has signed the most PFI deals, 105, with a total value of just over £2.5
billion. The largest of these, in monetary terms, is the University College London Hospitals NHS
Trust PFI project. The £404 million project includes a development in Euston Road, London to
house the University College Hospitals (UCHs), the Middlesex Hospital and the Hospital for
Tropical Diseases all on one site.
Table 5-1 PFI Signed Deals by Department, as at 1 September 20011
Number E million
Transport, Local Government and the Regions 58 8,289
Health 105 2,502
Defense 37 1,868
Scotland 56 1,865
Home Office 39 1,379
Education and Skills 69 1,167
Work and Pensions 7 835
Inland Revenue 8 391
GCHQ 1 330
Wales 11 309
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 8 249
Lord Chancellor's Departments 7 208
Trade and Industry 8 185
Northern Ireland 22 130
Treasury 1 118
Customs & Excise 1 73
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 4 62
Northern Ireland Court Service 2 58
Office of Government Commerce 1 10
Culture, Media and Sport 3 7
Public Record Office 1 -
Other 1 -
Total 450 20,033
Table 5-2 shows the number and amount of PFI deals classified by base facility. 127
deals are hospital facilities and most PFI deals and the highest amount was spent for railway
facilities which include Channel Tunnel Rail Link Project (CTRL). Infrastructure such as road or
railway accounts for large amount in PFI market in the U.K..
1 Source: Office of Government Commerce
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Table 5-2 PFI Signed Deals by Facility, as at 1 September 20012
Types of Facility Number £ million
Hospital 127 2,947
School 86 1,713
Public Office 49 1,919
Communication, Information 41 1,471
Defense 37 1,868
Road 20 2,088
Prison 10 452
Sewage 9 588
Waste disposal and treatment facility 6 262
Health, Insurance 6 103
Railway 5 5,134
Underground 5 905
Car transportation 5 106
Library 5 42
Housing 3 7
Others 36 429
Total 450 20,033
5.2.3. Size of projects
Figure 5-2 sets up the classification of the PFI projects in the U.K. based on their sizes.
Since the PFI was started in 1992, in terms of the size of each project, the range of "less than 150
million pounds" accounts for 50% of total amount.
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Figure 5-2
PFI deals have ranged from small projects, such as the E100,000 Littlehampton
Community School ITC facilities project in West Sussex, to the E4 billion deal for the Channel
Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL). Table 5-3 shows the 15 largest PFI deals, in value terms, as at 1
September 2001. As the table shows, most of the largest PFI deals were construction projects for
infrastructures such as facilities for road network or communication network. There are various
reasons for easy application to them. The methods for transferring risk from public sector to
private sector or collecting fare from the facility users could be important factors, of course,
there would be other factors to be considered.
Table 5-3 PFI Projects over £200 million, as at 1 September 20013
Department Year signed £ million
Channel Tunnel Rail Link DTLR 2000 4,178
PRIME(Accommodation transfer to the private sector DWP 1995 665
Public Safety Radio Communication Project HO 1995 500
Birmingham N. Relief Road DTLR 2000 450
Northern Line Trains DTLR 1995 409
University College London Hospital NHST DoH 1995 404
Main Building Redevelopment Headquarters MoD 2000 400
London Underground Connect DTLR 2000 355
Second Severn Crossing DTLR 1995 331
GCHQ Building FCO 2000 330
Armed Forces Personnel Administration Agency(AFPAA) MoD 2000 264
Project 2002(Glasgow Schools Project, 29schools) Scotland 1995 225
Mi/Al Link Road DTLR 2000 214
Croydon Tramlink DTLR 2000 205
DLR Extension - Lewisham Link DTLR 2000 202
3 Source: Office of Government Commerce
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5.3. PFI Capital Expenditure
Short-term Expenditure
According to the 2001 Pre-Budget Report, public sector capital expenditure is projected
to rise from E19.0 billion in 2000/01 to E33.2 billion in 2003/04. As a proportion of GDP, public
sector capital expenditure will rise from 2.0% of GDP to 3.0% over this period. It is expected
that the rise in public sector capital expenditure will be supplemented by capital expenditure
under the PFI, raising total publicly sponsored capital expenditure from E22.9 billion in 2000/01
to £35.6 billion in 2003/04. The figures are set out in Table 5-4.
Table 5-4 Public Sector Capital Expenditure4
£ billion 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
Total public sector capital expenditure 19.0 26.0 28.8 33.2
(As % of GDP) (2.0%) (2.6%) (2.8%) (3.0%)
Estimated capital expenditure under PFI 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.4
(As % of total public capital expenditure) (17.0%) (11.9%) (9.7%) (6.7%)
Total publicly sponsored capital expenditure 22.9 29.5 31.9 35.6
(As % of GDP) (2.4%) (3.0%) (3.0%) (3.2%)
Memo
Public sector gross investment 19.0 26.0 28.8 33.2
Less depreciation -12.7 -13.2 -14.0 -14.6
Public sector net investment 6.3 12.8 14.8 18.6
(As % of GDP) (0.7%) (1.3%) (1.4%) (1.7%)
PFI capital spending may be additional to public sector capital expenditure as both
public sector capital expenditure and total publicly sponsored capital expenditure are set to rise
over the period. In reality it is difficult to demonstrate that something is additional to what would
have happened anyway. As a first round effect, some PFI capital expenditure is clearly
substitutional as some public capital spending is replaced.
4 Transport Select Committee, Roadsfor the Future, 1 February 1990, HC 198-I 1989-90, para 154-156.
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Investment for the PFI may be additional when any second round effects are taken into
account. For example, public funds that are released from a department's capital program, by an
injection of PFI investment, can be used elsewhere to create additional activity. This could be
additional spending compared with what would have been the case in the absence of the PFI. A
second way in which PFI could provide additional spending is through efficiency savings, which
again would release public funds for other purposes.
The Treasury publishes capital spending by the private sector by sponsoring department.
The relevant estimates for 2000/01 to 2003/04 appear in Table 5-5. The table shows that over the
period estimated capital spending by private sector will be 1 13 billion.
Table 5-5 Departmental Estimate of Capital Spending by the Private Sector 5
Y million
Estimate Predictions
Total
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
Defense 121 147 200 100 568
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 7 7 6 7 27
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food 0 0 9 0 0
Trade and Industry 36 61 24 26 147
Environment, Transport and Regions 619 639 855 1,015 3,128
Education and Employment 15 28 9 0 52
Home Office 160 136 297 0 593
Legal Departments 37 36 13 6 92
Culture, Media and Sport 0 0 0 0 0
Health 491 501 235 67 1,294
Social Security 42 17 67 14 140
Scotland 540 289 78 20 927
Wales 160 11 0 0 171
Northern Ireland 39 26 4 0 69
Chancellor's Departments 104 87 19 19 229
Cabinet Office 155 159 42 6 362
Local Authorities 1,352 1,404 1,215 1,150 5,121
Total 3,878 3,548 3,046 2,430 12,920
5 Source: HM Treasury, FSBR 2001, HC 297, Table C16
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Long-term Expenditure
In response to a recommendation from the Treasury Committee in 1996 the Treasury
now publishes forecasts of the committed expenditure for public services flowing from private
sector investments signed under the PFI. The following Figure 5-3 from the 2001 Financial
Statement and Budget Report (FSBR) set out the estimated future payments to the private sector
for signed PFI deals.
Actual expenditure in future years arising from deals will depend upon the payment
mechanism details for each contract. However, these figures do not tell the whole story, as more
PFI deals are signed the size of payments to the private sector will increase further.
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Figure 5-3 Long-term Forecast of Capital Expenditure under the PFI
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5.4. Sharing of Risks
Perception Gap between Public and Private Sectors
As for transferring risks in PFI projects, the recognition of the optimal point is different
between public and private sectors even in the U.K. Given that some risks are difficult to
quantify, such as the liabilities that would be transferred back to the public sector in the case of a
collapsed DBFO hospital project, it is difficult to decide to what extent the transfer of risk can be
deemed optimal. The small amount of available evidence on risk transfer available suggests, that
at least in some sectors, PFI contracts have transferred to the private sector a substantial degree
of responsibility for some of the risks involved in constructing, operating and maintaining public
services and financing the assets that support them. The National Audit Office (NAO) recently
surveyed public and private partners involved in 121 PFI projects prior to 2000. Over 95% of
both partners agreed that the allocation of risk was either wholly or partially appropriate.
However, the views of the partners varied when asked whether they believed the project risks
had been allocated optimally. 80% of public sector partners thought the allocation of risk wholly
appropriate while only 50% of the private sector partners agreed. An efficiently designed PFI
project contract should involve the optimum transfer of all types of risk. Where the financial
risks of a public service project cannot be transferred to the private sector, different forms of
public private partnerships (PPP's) other then the PFI should be investigated such as design,
build and operate (DBO) projects. With all this in mind, the main argument put forward by
proponents of the PFI, that it provides value for money through the transfer of risk, would be
better defined as value for money through the "optimal allocation of risk".
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5.5. Current Issues
Though a number of infrastructure projects have been procured by PFI scheme in the
U.K., There are many unresolved issues which need to be thrashed out. According to the research
by Grahame Allen, the following issues are found in the process of PFI.
High Bidding Costs
Private partners have often criticized the high cost of organizing bids for PFI projects. It
is argued that private sector contractors who tend for PFI project bids have to cover higher
'front-loaded' costs when drawing up detailed specifications and contract terms than when
preparing bids for public services projects under conventionally tendered contracts. There is little
hard evidence for the cost of the tendering process as it is usually considered confidential. The
evidence that does exist appears to support the argument. Figure 5-4 shows the average cost for
bid by size of the project is higher for PFI public services projects than for traditionally procured
projects.
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The report finds the total cost of tendering for a PFI project to all potential contractors
to be just under 3% of expected total costs while for traditional procurement the total costs
accounted for just under 1%.
One reason for the higher cost of bidding for PFI projects is that the time taken between
offering public services projects to the private sector and the final signing of the deal can be
protracted, especially for particularly intricate and technical projects. The average time taken to
complete PFI deals has been estimated at 26 for local government.
There is some evidence to suggest that the relatively more expensive time spent
negotiating PFI contracts with preferred bidders is longer than the time taken to initially select
the bidder. If this time is not specifically included in either private or public sector cost estimates
it increases total expected costs. These costs can be disproportionately high when the PFI project
is small scale. The audit Commission has recently produced guidance for local government
managers aimed at reducing the time taken to close PFI deals.
The Cost of Borrowing
Under PFI, a public sector may gain access to private financing but the cost of such
funds is unlikely to be as low as loans for the traditional procurement. The PFI does not provide
a cheaper source of finance to public sectors on the same conditions as the case of traditional
procurement, probably at a higher capital cost than traditional one. Under present Treasury rules,
public (profit-making) corporations cannot borrow and invest like private sector enterprises as
their borrowing is treated as public expenditure. Comparisons of the cost of borrowing by
government and the private sector are very difficult to make. The cost of borrowing at any time
is determined by a variety of factors, although the main determinants are likely to be the risk of
default and the expected returns. PFJ scheme is considered riskier than traditional one in the U.K.
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Government borrowing for traditional procurement is backed by tax revenues and so is
virtually risk-free and hence the cheapest way of raising funds. Private sector companies, which
have no such guarantees, are inherently riskier propositions and hence borrow on less
advantageous terms. City, or local authority, borrowing may be somewhere between these two,
although some companies might be able to borrow money more cheaply than a public authority,
especially if the authority is relatively new or has a less than perfect reputation for financial
rigor.
Due to the difficulties involved in comparing the actual costs of public and private
financing of PFI projects, disparities in the yields of bonds issued by public, private and
public/private organizations have often been looked at as proxies. In this cost hierarchy the
cheapest source of funds comes from government. Next it is suggested, would be a
government/fare revenue backed body such as London Underground. Next are large public
limited companies (PLCs) many of whom are PFI players. However, this does not take us very
far since a PLC is likely to raise capital by a cost-minimizing combination of a new share issue,
bank finance and commercial bonds rather than just through a bond issue alone.
The crucial aspect here is the cost differential between the alternatives. According to
figures in the Financial Times the yield on 10-year government bonds at the close of play on 12
September 2001 was 4.9%. Similarly dated corporate bonds ranged between 6.9% for Gallaher
and 5.6% for Halifax. This suggests that the extra borrowing cost of corporate bonds could be at
least one and a half percentage point higher than government bonds. The differential between the
returns on public funds and private equity is likely to be much greater. This was demonstrated in
the NAO report on the Skye Bridge. The NAO calculated that the extra financing cost of the
Skye Bridge was some E4 million on a total project cost of E28 million, or one-seventh. The cost
of (private) equity was some 18.4% in real terms, compared with the cost of public capital of 6%.
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In this case the private finance option required more than 12% percentage points per year above
the public finance rate.
Legal Issues
In addition to the financial issues, there are some legal issues concerning effective application of
PFI. Under present European Commission rules for public procurement, contracts above a
certain financial threshold are put out to competitive bidders in the Official Journal of the
European Communities (OJEC). With regard to the PFI in the UK, these rules allow Government
to chose a preferred bidder from the bidders they receive on the basis that they offer the most
economically advantageous bid. The preferred bidder then negotiates the detailed proposals for a
specific project, with two reserve bidders also chosen in case negotiations with the preferred
bidder break down before a contract is signed. Under proposals for a new European public
procurement directive, the public sector will no longer be able to select a preferred bidder. At
least three bidders will be required to continue negotiations until the finalized PFI contract is
signed. This kind of legal restrictions could lead to the cost of bidding becoming high for the
private sector, who are already worried about the high cost presently incurred by preferred
bidders.
With respect to the selection of bidders for PFI projects, the government needs to
simplify the legal framework and minimize the sunk cost created amongst those involved with
the PFI. Otherwise, the PFI becomes unworkable in terms of time and cost factors.
85
Chapter 6. Private Finance Initiative in the Japanese
Construction Market
Of the many structural reforms proposed by the Koizumi Administration,
one that has been given a particularly high level of priority is the reform of public
works. The PFI scheme has been adopted to the construction project in Japan since
1998 and the growing market seemingly promises the government to revitalize
depressed construction sector. However, same mistake can be made as the case of "the
Third Sector", unless the government completely understand where, when and how to
apply the private finance to the public works. The government has to recognize the
differences of private financing schemes between PFI and the others in order to
appropriate introduction of PFI, and establish the principles of private financing
suitable for a severe environment surrounding Japanese construction industry.
This chapter first describes some kinds of the Japanese style of approach
to the commissioning of public works to the private sector; "privatization", "the Third
Sector (joint public-private venture)," and "outsourcing (contracting-out)",
incorporating the principles of the Japanese version of the PFI system and differences
among those systems, as a means of reform, and examines its content, the scale of the
market, its benefits in terms of reducing the burden on government finance, etc.
Secondary, this chapter shows current PFI status in Japan and future perspective of the
market. Though Japan has practically imitated the U.K. style on the application of
private financing as a initial step, Japanese version of PFI has not been exactly same
form as that in the U.K. because of many reasons i.e. the difference of circumstances
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surrounding construction industry, certain legal regulations, or other financial issues
between the two. Finally, this chapter describes and analyzes the current issues
hampering Japanese version of PFI and discusses means for solving the issues from
various point of view to embark on new phase of private financing in Japan.
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6.1. Private Financing in the Japanese Construction Industry
6.1.1. Types of Private Financing for Public Works
Since the 1980s, there have been many trials of private financing by the government in
Japanese construction industry. Figure 6-1 shows the states of Japanese style of private financing
schemes including pure public and private projects. Japanese government positions PFI as a
private financing scheme which is providing more public service by private entities. On the
contrary, "privatization", "the Third Sector" and "Contracting-out (what is called outsourcing)"
in Japan has been organized at the initiatives of the central government and the system has
hampered the full-fledged initiatives of the private sector. Except for a few success cases such as
Japan Railway Corporation (JR) or NTT, most of the cases have difficulties in their management,
especially in "the Third Sector." Those organizations give rise to the major issue of cozy
relationships among politicians, bureaucrats and business including appointment of a former
government official to a high position in a private company. It doesn't make clear the scope of
management responsibility and make little attempt to take it in public-private partnership. As
Figure 6-1 shows, the Third Sector has half-public body and supplies half-private service. The
contracting-out called "Outsourcing" in Japan also includes public organization and supplies
private service. Except for a few cases in privatization, most of the companies have not achieved
full-scale privatization yet. In principle, the government is not involved in the management, once
the privatized company independently started up the business. However, it actually goes against
original policy of not taking part in the management of the company because most companies
cannot keep their business smoothly without governmental financial support. As described in
Chapter 2, centralized governance structure had bad effect so far on the effectiveness of market
mechanism by involving private sector. Now, it needs to develop appropriate strategy to apply
THE PFI scheme to upgrade infrastructure by pointing out various defects hiding behind each
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private financing scheme.
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Figure 6-1 Private Financing Scheme in Japan
6.1.2. Selection of Private Financing Scheme
When the government introduces market forces into the development of infrastructure,
one of the private finance schemes is to be selected based on characteristics of the project with
the purpose of maximizing the profit of using it.
Figure 6-2 shows the decision making process which is revised POT (Prior Option Test)
by the author in order to introduce market mechanism to the public works. PFI is second highest
hierarchy in terms of effectiveness of private financing after privatization, then contracting-out
(outsourcing) scheme and the Third Sector are following it. In fact, there has been inadequate
process to decide the private financing scheme of public works so far in Japan. As a result, the
government has lightly chosen the Third Sector scheme as a best one for a long time. That is why
there was no solid evaluation system for it in the government policy and it is taken for granted
that the private company takes all risks and responsibilities as a package to proceed infrastructure
projects without any consideration. Besides, the Japanese public sector is apparently
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conservative, and is certainly not known for speedily and zealously embracing market forces.
Some officials would no doubt prefer it to stay that way, citing past experience. There has been a
little effort the government has done to introduce private entrepreneurship into public works.
One experiment in particular, the creation of "third-sector" companies jointly financed by public
and private owners, has been disastrous. With most of these companies now in the red,
third-sector projects have become a bad example for mismanagement, corruption and the abuse
of bureaucratic power. Belatedly, the government is trying to purely privatize them.
Central Government
Is the project necessary?
LaYes
Is privatization model available?
,a No
Is PFI model available?
,aJ No
Is outsourcing model available?
Cancel
Privatization
Outsourcing
Outsourcing
No a7No
Is agency model available? The third sector
Based on "Setting Up Next Steps" Gold Diana, 1991
Figure 6-2 Revised Prior Options Test
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6.1.3. Details and Issues of Private Financing in Japan
Privatization
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is generally not used as the same meaning of
"privatization" in the sense that the latter term is most commonly used. In Japan, the meaning of
"privatization" is narrowly interpreted and the privatization as one of the infrastructure
procurement systems is one that was originally owned by the public sector and is finally owned
by the private sector. By the implementation of privatization, the privatized entity may entry into
the highly competitive market (as, for example, an airplane or telecommunications market) or
hold a monopoly position and so require active regulation once it is transferred to the private
sector(as, for example, railway company or utility company). In either case, the ownership is to
be transferred from public sector to the private sector to pull out of the business. In principle, the
government is not involved in the management, once the privatized company independently
starts up the business. When the ownership can be completely shifted from public sector to
private sector, government can reduce spending and the issuance of government bonds. Besides,
the privatized company can make the most of its own capital and know-how in business, and it
can make clear the scope of management responsibility. However, there have been a few
successful experiences so far in Japan. Privatization is the ideal scheme of private financing and
work on theory, but it is very less versatile scheme due to mounting legal restriction and
profitability of the business to the private sector as a risk taker.
The Third Sector (Joint Public-Private Venture)
(1) What is the "Third Sector"
Over the past decade and a half in Japan, there has been an economic institution called
the "Third Sector", a hybrid of the First (public, i.e. government) and Second Sectors (private
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enterprise), which was proposed as a means to vitalize Japan's private sector through local
venture capital-cum-tax money. In theory, the Third Sector, under which a public-private
consortium buys stocks to create a brand-new company, promised the best of both worlds, the
economic targeting of bureaucrats complementing the management of profit-oriented
businessmen and entrepreneurs.
It is a worryingly large one. According to a 2000 government survey, the latest available,
Japan has 6,794 third sector companies, employing around 200,000 people. Their public capital
comes mostly from local governments, which among them have invested Y4.5 trillion ($38
billion). Local governments have been able to invest in these projects for years. But the third
sector really took off in the early 1980s, when Yasuhiro Nakasone, then prime minister, launched
a program of privatization and deregulation, inspired by Britain and America, to import into
government "the vitality of the private sector."
Unfortunately, it didn't work out that way, instead the Third Sector became the best of
both worlds for the corrupt. Government officials have wound up sinking taxes into unprofitable
projects in Babble-era, including theme parks, hotels, resorts, trade centers, and sundry
small-town tourist traps, the majority of which remain operating despite perpetual losses. On the
other hand the company members, shielded by regulations preventing their companies from
being audited properly, escaped the responsibility of formal bankruptcy and saw their enterprises
mutate into unsinkable public works projects, staffed by high-ranking bureaucrats. In the
management of Third Sector, Public non-financial corporations (e.g. Japan Highway Public
Corporation and local public housing corporations) hold outstanding assets worth Y168 trillion
($14 billion), including Y27 trillion ($2.3 billion) in financial assets like local government bonds,
loans, equity shares and investments, as well as tangible fixed assets like sewage and waste
disposal facilities, roads, and municipal and natural parks. Their liabilities aggregate Y136 trillion
92
($115 billion) including Y52 trillion ($4.4 billion)in non-equity securities, Y37 trillion ($3.1
billion) in borrowings and Y35 trillion ($3.0 billion) in equities and investment. Their net assets
come to a positive Y32 trillion ($2.7 billion).
(2) Issues Surrounding the Introduction of "Third Sector"
The third sector holds some pretty big problems. Finding out the problems of the Third
Sector scheme leads to find the problems inherent in Japanese systems.
(i) The first problem is what is called administrative continuity. Once the project is started, it is
almost impossible to change the plan even if it is going the wrong way. Hence, giant projects
cannot be altered or cancelled, even though the project conditions are changed.
(ii) Secondly, it doesn't make clear the scope of responsibility between public and private
sector's role. This totally causes both sectors a feeling of less incentive to operate the
business profitably. There is no target to achieve through the project and no penalty imposed
on the negligence of duty.
(iii) The third reason, which is related to second one, is that there is no place to utilize private
sector's capital and know-how due to the unwelcome intrusion by public sectors. Legal
restriction becomes major obstacle to make benefit under appropriate public-private
partnership.
Outsourcing (Contracting-out)
(1)What is Outsourcing?
The practice of commissioning the management and maintenance of facilities to private
business is already widespread in Japan. However, the private sector does not have enough room
to be more efficient by their own creative, and the system remains inefficient. "Outsourcing" is a
system that seeks to stimulate the creativity of the private sector, to reduce costs and to enhance
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efficiency, through the commissioning of projects to private business, and is characterized by:
" the introduction of performance-based ordering
" performance-based commission
" systems for the observance of performance
" an expansion of the scope of public works entrusted to private business
" contracts running for several fiscal years
At the national level, in the field of water and sewerage, efforts are being made to promote the
introduction of outsourcing.
(2) The Benefits of the Introduction of "Outsourcing"
According to the analysis by Japan Research Institute Ltd., the benefit of outsourcing are;
(i) An estimate of the scale of the outsourcing market based on the example of wastewater
treatment, for which a full range of data are available, suggests that an expansion of the
range of work on be outsourced could yield up to 250% market growth from the viewpoint
of the private sector. This could lead to the creation of new markets based on domestic
demand.
(ii) Meanwhile, the attendant reduction of the number of public officials and of the costs relating
to public works have the potential to cut overall management and maintenance costs by
around 20%.
(iii) Moreover, outsourcing is likely to promote the accumulation of management know-how by
private business. Major foreign companies have used the know-how they have accumulated
through outsourcing work in the context of the PFI's promoting outsourcing will make a
foundation for the introduction of the PFI system.
(3) Issues Surrounding the Introduction of "Outsourcing"
Compared with other private financing scheme, the "outsourcing" is adopting in less competitive
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markets in Japan and there are some issues in the system as follows.
(i) Local governments do not have enough practical knowledge and experience of outsourcing
with some exceptions. Therefore, management of the business is highly depends on the
central government. Adequate step guide may help local governments to make smooth
progress of application. Each private sector should have its own regulations and guidelines
which are suitable for surrounding environment.
(ii) There is no appropriate allocation of roles between public and private sectors in business
management. It creates inefficient structure of the business by evasion of responsibility
between the two sectors. Every local government needs to have effective framework for risk
management in order to clearly differentiate the roles of the government from those of the
private sector
(iii) There is no concrete business target. Private sector's effort does not lead directly to get its
benefit, so it doesn't give total efforts to carrying out the business. Therefore, the business
cannot reflect the advantage of adopting private sector's know-how and management ability.
(iv) Market mechanism doesn't work in the business field because the scheme makes private
sectors lose their competitive spirit. And it may stifle the improvement of technologies in the
business field, so the company cannot provide effective service to the customers.
There is a fundamental distinction between outsourcing and other private financing
schemes at the provision of infrastructure services. Outsourcing implies the transferring of
management rights of the business originally owned by public sectors to private sectors to supply
more effective public service by introducing market mechanism. In contrast, other private
financing schemes include the transferring of capital assets owned by public sectors to private
sectors as well. In fact, the business is comparatively small and expecting market mechanism by
95
involving private power does not work properly. However it is enough useful to reduce
government expenditure.
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6.2. Current State of the PFI Market in Japan
As a part of these reform policies, Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has been highlighted
to rebuild central and local government economy with the purpose of achieving better
partnerships between public and private sectors. Though the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has
only recently been introduced to Japan, there are already some innovative approaches to this
scheme in public works projects. Since PFI Law went into effect in September 1999, as at March
2003 there has been 98 PFI deals, including 9 service started, 21 contract completed and 68
guideline announced projects in Japan. The increased level of activity is expected to be continued
and the relationship between public and private sector must be changed to meet the complex and
challenging market needs as the market grows in the future.
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6.2.1. Market Overview
Figure 6-3 shows the number of monthly PFI deals classified based on the progress in
the application process since PFI Law went into effect in September 1999. Application of PFI
was started in May 2000 and the number has been increased constantly until March 2003.
During the number of deals has been significantly increased to 98 for 3 years, only 9
projects of them started to supply service and 21 projects has been already signed contracts as of
March 2003. 68 projects of which are respectively in one of the process categorized as;
(i)pre-qualification of the project by public sector, (ii)announcement of project guideline,
(iii)invitation of bid, (iv)evaluation of bidders, or (v)final negotiation and waiting for contracts.
No PFI project executed by national government has started to supply services. Japanese version
of PFI has just started.
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Figure 6-4 shows the number of PFI deals classified based on executive organization,
national government or local government, since September 1999. Actual PFI application was
started at the initiative of local governments and then national government started it from
February 2002. Local governments actively implemented wider adoption of the PFI scheme with
the help from national government policy of structural reform. Feasibility studies of more than
200 projects are being proceeded and the number of ongoing PFI is more likely to increase in the
future. As in the past, in particular, local governments will actively introduce the private sector
way of management to the wide range of purpose.
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Figure 6-4 PFI Achievement in Japan as to March 31, 2003
(Executive Organization)
Figure 6-5 shows the shares of 98 PFI deals by individual clients. As for local
governments, prefectures and cities, as clients of projects, are occupying a large share of the PFI
market in Japan. On the contrary, wards or towns and villages have small share in the market.
That is why towns and villages don't have enough administrative experience and adequate ability
to manage the project. They also don't have enough financial resource. In terms of the publicity
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of the project, comparatively large projects in the cities or prefectures are possible to be more
effective than small one in towns or villages because the more people can enjoy the service. The
project size is an important factor of the effective application of PFI in Japan. When the
governments apply PFI to extremely large or small project, it needs to pay close attention to
planning and management.
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5.1% 3.1%
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- 23.5%
Figure 6-5 PFI Achievement; Classified by Client
Figure 6-6 shows the share of PFI deals by bidding systems. There are two types of bid
system; "Comprehensive competitive bid type" and "Negotiated contract type" in the Japanese
PFI market. The former bidding system is based on the competitive bid, but price is not only the
factor of winning bid in the system. It comprehensively takes the quality of maintenance and
management or level of technology into consideration at the bid evaluation. Therefore, the public
sector has to establish a clear set of criteria for evaluating the quality of the bid and decide the
best proposal in using this system. In this regard, local governments are making their own
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standard based on that of national government, but actual evaluations are quite ambiguous and
sometimes they are not disclosed. Finally the winning bidder is often selected by the member of
the committee in dogmatic manner. The latter bidding system is based on the negotiated contract.
After the local government selects one winning bidder from the bidders which satisfied the
evaluation criteria made by the public sector, the contract amount is negotiated between both
sectors within the budget. This system also needs the clear criteria and appropriate evaluation
method at prequalification and final selection stage, but as in the case with former system, those
rules has not been fully functioned.
Bidding System: n=98
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Figure 6-6 PFI Achievement; Classified by Bidding System
Figure 6-7 shows the shares of deals by the PFI schemes. BTO scheme own more than
half of all the projects. BTO scheme has been adopted in most of the national government
projects (20 in 22 projects) and 40% of local government projects (30 in 78 projects). The reason
why BTO scheme is major in the Japanese PFI market is that the government does not intend to
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transfer much risk to the private sectors in the case. BTO system is recognized as low risk
scheme in all PFI schemes because the private sector doesn't have to take its operating risks and
financial risks. In fact, the risk management in the PFI project has not been understood yet by
both of public and private sectors because the application of PFI has just started in Japan. On the
contrary, in the BOT scheme, private sectors have to take risks (e.g. interest volatility risk) and
responsibilities (e.g. negotiation with neighbors) of the project during the operating period. In the
case, the total amount of risks taken by private sectors is larger than that in the BTO project. It
expresses the conservative approach to the risk transfer by Japanese government and both of
public and private sectors are carefully considering the risks now. However, as discussed in
Chapter 4, insufficient risk transferring by being oversensitive to it leads to inefficiency of the
PFI scheme. As the risks are transferred adequately, the benefit becomes larger for both sectors.
PFI scheme: n=98
Hy brid Free
RO 1.0%
4.1% 2.0%
Figure 6-7 PFI Achievement; Classified by PFI Scheme
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6.3. VFM achievement
VFM Estimation and Evaluation System
Table 6-3 shows the VFM achievement of 29 PFI projects that the information
concerning VFM has been disclosed to the public. According to the table, based on the same PSC,
the average of the expected VFM estimated by public sectors at the beginning of the project for
feasibility is half as the average VFM estimated by private sectors at the bid. The fact explains
that the estimation method of public sectors is not same as private sector's one. Therefore, many
profitable projects have been missed due to obscure estimations by public sectors. Besides there
is no cutoff point in the criteria of the feasibility study, so the evaluation method of VFM
becomes vague. Private sectors have to be involved from the beginning of the project planning in
order to improve the accuracy of VFM estimation and not to miss good opportunities for private
sectors to participate in the PFI.
Market Integration
Through the PFI projects, private sectors sell the service to the users. As opposed to the
traditional construction project, the infrastructure facility is the medium for collecting charge in
the PFI project. One of the main purposes of PFI is providing high quality service to the
customer rather than construction of the facilities. Though the construction work is important, the
project company (sponsor company) of the project doesn't have to be a construction company.
As shown in Table 6-1, around half of the sponsor companies of these 29 projects are not
construction companies. Those companies have been made contract with a construction company
on the construction separately from the management of the facilities. There will be a new
framework of market for infrastructure development in Japan. PFI will accelerate market
integration and industrial integration by increasing business transaction across industrial borders.
There is no more traditional bidding system for construction work under PFI.
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Table 6-1 Value For Money
National Government
Expected VFM at Actual VMF PSC Contract price Private contractor (Sponsor PFt
Public client Progress project evaluation at contract (million yen) (million yen) company of the group) scheme
1 TReprese tates seetactor 8.7% 29.20% 49,006 33,393 Kajima Co. BTO
2 The Department of Contractor 3.0% 17.49% 7,667 6,381 Nippon Steel BTOthe Treasury Iselected I________ I_____ 1_____ 1______ _ ___________
3 The Department of Contractor 3.0% 27.71% 10,102 7,370 Obayashi Co. BTOthe Treasury Iselected I____________________________________
Local Government
Expected VFM at Actual VMF PSC Contract price Private contractor (Sponsor PFIPublic client Progress project evaluation at contract (million yen) (million yen) company of the group) scheme
4 Chiba Prefecture Service 9.00% 52.00% 2,406 1,153 Maeda Corp. BOTChibaPrefeture started
5 Kanagawa Service 8.10% 23.20% 17,823 16,791 Mitsubishi Corp. BOTPretecture started ____
6 Kanagawa Service 7.40% 28.33% 9,603 6,882 ITOCHU Corp. BOT
___Prefecture started ________________
7 Okayama city comleted 4.00% 45.00% 3,574 1,966 Obayashi Corp. BOT
8 Tokyo prefecture conpeted 7.00% 11.00% 60,730 53,940 Hitachi Corp. BOO
9 Chofu city Service 17.00% 31.00% 4,813 3,343 Mitsui & Co. BOTChofu city started_________________________
10 naeture completed 23.80% 28.60% 2,146 1,560 Orix Corp. BOO
11 Kochi pref.&city Contractor 5.00% 4.20% 131,505 126,050 Orix Corp. BTO
Iselected ____
12 Yakumo city Contractor 7.10% 19.70% 1,165 935 Taisei Corp. BTO
selected ________________
13 Tokyo prefecture Contractor 8.00% 1.50% 16,538 16,288 Obayashi Corp. BOT
selected ____
14 Kashihara city Contractor 53.00% 56.30% - - Nippon Steel BTOselected_____
15 Omiyawata city Contractor 8.00% 14.40% 39,149 33,529 Obayashi Corp. BOT
I________ selected
16 Kurashiki city Contractor 6.10% 11.06% 28,626 25,461 Kawatetsu Group BTO
_______________selected ____________ ___________________
17 Oita prefecture Service 9.00% 0.40% 1,356 1,350 Nippon Steel BOT
______________started_______
18 Kuwana city Contractor 12.50% 22.00% 9,774 7,612 Kajima Corp. BOT
I________ selected
19 Shiga prefecture Contractor 11.50% 12.80% 7,040 6,139 Obayashi Corp. BOT
______________selected
20 Yashika city Service 47.00% 25.50% - - Kitai Design Corp. BOT
______________started
21 Okayama prefecture Service 7.00% 20.00% 3,532 2,824 Obayashi Co. BTO
I________ started
22 Tokyo prefecture Contract 8.00% 43.00% 17,030 9,670 Tokyo Electric Power BTO
_______________completed
23 Kakogawa city Contractor 12.50% 25.50% 11,896 8,860 Kobe Steel BTO
______________selected
24 Tobetuki town and Contractor 9.00% 41.60% 2,485 1,450 Taisei Corp. BOTI__ Others selected
25 Kagawa prefecture Contractor 11.20% 12.10% 4,695 4,126 Toppan PRINTED Co. Ltd. BOTI selected
26 Chiba city Contractor 11.00% 21.80% 10,488 8,206 ITOCHU Corp. BTO
______________selected
27 Sapporo city Contractor 4.10% 18.80% 22,843 18,549 Toa. Corp. BOT2 ____hk_____y _ rselected
28 Ichikawa city Contractor 11.00% 26.00% - - Taisei Corp. BTO
__________selectedI
29 Ichikawa city Contractor 0.00% 26.00%1 5,992, 4,436 Taisei Corp. BTO
I________ iselectedII
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Total VFM 332.00% 696.19%
Average VFM 11.45% 24.01%
6.4. Future Market
Figure 6-8 shows the PFI market forecast from 2002 to 2010 estimated by Yano
Research Institute. According to the forecast, while the investment for public work is being
reduced, the amount of the PFI project is going to increase and the market share to the whole
public work is likely to grow at 8.2% in 2010. It is truly difficult to predict future movements of
the PFI market including projections of Japan's economic and construction market growth. The
market volatility is highly affected by the issue that the application of the PFI scheme has just
started in Japan and the mechanism of the market is yet to be established.
Under the reform of public financing, how the PFI scheme will be improved and
changed its structure in the future is a critical element of market forecast. The market interest has
to be changed responding to the social and economic needs in order to maximize its benefit to
the users. Accurate future forecast of the market leads to the adequate allocation of revenue
source to the local government.
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Figure 6-8 PFI Market Forecast
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6.5. Issues and Challenges of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI)
6.5.1. Issues in Japan's PFI
(1) Risk Allocation
According to all the PFI contract documents already awarded, all risks have not been
allocated appropriately amongst those involved in the project. The public sectors are still holding
a wrong image of risk allocation. They stick to their incorrect opinion of transferring the risks to
private sectors. They seem to consider how to transfer financial and political responsibility as
much as possible to private sectors. Therefore, in the information disclosure document, they
highlight how much they could pass the project risk onto private sectors rather than
comprehensive VFM. Their idea, "the more the risks are transferred to the private sectors, the
better the project planning becomes" leads to an ineffective use of the PFI scheme and affects the
achievement of maximum VFM.
(2) Bidding System
Under the current legal and taxation system, the PFI scheme is at a disadvantage in
competition with the traditional system. As observed in the U.K. cases, the time at planning and
bidding stage under PFI is tends to be longer than the time under the traditional system. Many
bidders are suspended until the final stage of the bid. The wasted bidding cost of failed
companies is likely to add to the next bid and it makes a price higher. On the other hand, the
medium and small companies can hardly participate in the PFI project because they don't have
enough staff and resources for competitive bidding. As a result, well-financed or limited large
companies dominate the market, and hence, the market mechanism doesn't work properly. For
encouraging every private sector to participate in PFI and to compete actively in the bid, the
government has to establish a new legal framework, especially in the evaluation process.
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(3) Less Competitiveness due to Low Profits
In present circumstances, it seems difficult for private sectors to ensure the profitability
of the company by entering the Japanese PFI market. Therefore, the number of participants in the
bid decrease and competition become less fierce. As discussed above, the bid is competed for
only among the companies which have enough financial power to spare for implementation of
the project. Appropriate project feasibility study by the private sector is the essential condition
for obtaining the success of PFI, though it is very difficult. The government has to encourage the
private sectors to participate in PFI projects. For example, the "incentive system" is a method to
maximize the ability of private sectors by paying an additional bonus if the private sector's
services are better than those specified in the initial contract.
(4) Financial Issue
In addition to the above bidding system, the PFI scheme has another disadvantage over
the traditional one in raising funds. The government borrowing for traditional project
procurement is basically risk-free and hence the cheapest way of raising funds. Besides, the
longest loan limit of direct financing is around 15 years in Japan and it doesn't fit to the
long-term, over 30 years, PFI project. It reduces the chance to invest various projects by private
sectors under the application of PFI in Japan and so narrows the possibilities of the PFI scheme
itself. The government has to establish the lending system for the implementation of the PFI
project.
(5) Lack of Clear Objectives for PFI
The basic premise of the application of PFI is maximizing the effectiveness of social
services and PFI is important in terms of economic performance and efficiency. Therefore,
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governments should carefully select the project meeting to the social needs or fitting to the
environment surrounding the society. In order to specify the project priority or details of the
business, each public sector should establish its own criteria, and it needs to work efficiently in
the implementation of PFI. Heavy dependence on the national government regarding legal
regulations or financial support may cause same mistakes as they made in the past. The
dependency on national government misleads the PFI application not to reflect the needs or not
to supply adequate services.
(6) Lack of Experts of PFI in Local Governments
Most local governments get negative to start PFI due to its intricate system and tangled
bureaucratic procedures. For the application of PFI in local governments, they initially need to
employ professional advisors and establish a framework to apply private financing to public
works. Local governments have to support themselves economically and realize administration
closely related to local residents. In this sense, they need to develop human resources and
technical PFI experts in public sectors.
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6.5.2. Japanese Version of PFI
From the perspective of administrative reform, the proposed Japanese version of PFI
hardly measures up to its U.K. counterpart. Indeed, PFI will merely be an extension of the
private financing policy, and lack the positive macroeconomic impact being enjoyed in the U.K.
The objective of PFI is to establish the framework for promoting private sector's
activity to build social infrastructure and contribute to the revitalization of the economy. This is
based on the idea of "maximizing the services to consumers (users)." The final destination is not
to construct public facilities including roads, railroads and canals, parks, waterworks, public
housing, educational and cultural facilities, waste processing facilities, information and
communications facilities, new energy facilities, and re-cycling facilities. A comparison with
other countries sheds more light on Japan's problems. In the U.K., the government has tried to
leave the developing process of infrastructure to private sector and buy high quality public
services directly from the project. Japan has much to learn in this respect.
Many local governments are still misunderstanding what the PFI is for and they don't
understand that the benefit from PFI project finally returns to governments. Underlying this is a
more fundamental confusion about what private financing projects are for: the public interest or
private profit? Local governments in Japan seem inclined towards the former notion, yet the act
of private sectors creates expectations of the second. Therefore, governments should clarify the
benefit and loss of the project to private sectors and share them to maximize the benefit for both
sectors. Japanese government has to learn from the past mistakes and explore the best way to
achieve successful private financing.
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Chapter 7. New Market Exploring for Private Financing
Private Finance Initiative in Japan has been prevailed targeting at
domestic infrastructure development and the number of projects in service become 9
until now as discussed in Chapter 6. PFI has originally started in U.K. and the
potentials of PFI scheme has been widely discussed in Europe. Japanese public and
private sectors have also argued over the wide range of possibilities to be applied in
other markets.
This chapter discusses future expansion of Japanese version of PFI with
an introduction of two big potential markets. First, it describes the current status and
future potential of private financing in repair and maintenance market. The amount of
social stock in Japan has been cumulatively increasing and the huge amount of
maintenance work of aged infrastructures has recently been recognized as a national
issue by the government. Japanese private sectors have a keen interest to the
expanding market. Secondary, it examines private financing in overseas market,
especially in Asian country. Japan has historically and geographically taken an
advantage to the infrastructure development in Asian construction market. After Asian
currency crisis in 1997, the governments in Asian countries have started to accept
investment by foreign private companies. In the future, the market will be expanding
and become a good investment opportunity for foreign companies. On the other hand,
there are many issues and obstacles are lying in between the government and foreign
private companies.
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7.1. Renewal Work for Existing Infrastructure
While the construction market continues to shrink, maintenance and repair works are
steadily increasing. General contractors are seeking business chances in the renewal market.
They are increasing staff number in their renewal divisions or creating new renewal-related
divisions and affiliated companies. Competition in the office building market is intensifying.
Clients seek lower costs, and more technical expertise and ability to make proposals of the
contractors. In the market for infrastructure development, the potential of the market become
higher while the aging structure is rapidly increasing. There are some reason for adopting PFI
scheme to the renewal market in Japan; (1) the amount of renewal project is comparatively
smaller than new construction, and so it doesn't need long operating period by private sectors,
(2) the know-how for structure renewal work is traditionally on the private sector's side, so PFI
scheme is likely to penetrate in the market easily. As for the former reason, the longest loan limit
of direct financing is generally around 15 years and this condition is suitable for mid-term
project such as renewal work. As for the latter one, the technology for renewal work is rapidly
progressing in private sectors and many kinds of software for asset management service are
being developed. The software provides a comprehensive structure inventory, condition
assessment, needs development, and program generation capability. In particular, U.S. and U.K.
are the leader in this field, and in particular, U.K. has already started to adopt private financing in
the renewal market. Traditionally, governments have been in charge of the maintenance and
repair work in Japan. However, since their social infrastructure has long been developed under
the initiative of national government, most local governments are losing control to maintain their
aged infrastructure and there is no scope to manage them in the future. The national government
is also having a trouble with management of enormous amount of social capital stock built in
post-war years all over Japan.
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7.1.1. Expansion of Renewal Market
The maintenance and repair market was expanded by 1.3 times in the period from
FY1990 to FY2000 from Y8.8 trillion to Y1 1.8 trillion. The ratio of maintenance and repair to the
total amount of completed projects is also increased from 12.9% to 18.8% respectively. The scale
of renewal market heavily depends on the amount of stock to which such works are applied. The
stock of private building grew by around 20% from 1990 to 1999, while that of social
infrastructure grew by around 60% from 1983 to 1993. The enormous amount of stock is aging
and will push up investment in maintenance and repair. Many infrastructure facilities completed
after the 1970s, in particular, will need maintenance and repair in the near future and will thus
expand the market, because maintenance and repair works including reconstruction and
expansion generally peak at around 30 years after construction.
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Figure 7-1 Investment for Renewal Work
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7.1.2. The Future Renewal Project Market
According to the future market analysis by Research Institute of Construction and
Economy, the size of the maintenance and repair market which is estimated based on the
correlation between stock and demand will expand due to growing stock. The analysis is based
on the three scenarios assuring different real economic growth rates. The scenarios assume that;
(1) Case 1: Real economic growth 2.0% from 2001 to 2010 and 2.5% from 2010 to 2020
(2) Case 2: Real economic growth 2.0% from 2001 to 2010 and 1.5% from 2010 to 2020
(3) Case 3: Real economic growth 2.0% from 2001(for reference)
Table 7-1 and Figure 7-2 show the mid- to long-term forecasts of renewal market made
by the institute. It says the overall renewal market is estimated to be $168.8 billion in FY2001.
the market size grow to $202-204 billion in FY2010, and to $226-237 billion in FY2020
finally(numbers are based on constant price in 1995).
Table 7-1 Mid- to Long-term Forecasts of Renewal Market
In billion $
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
2001-2010 2011-2020 2001-2010 2011-2020 2010
GDP growth, GDP growth, GDP growth, GDP growth, GDP growth,
2.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0%
Year 2000 2010 2020 2010 2020 2010
Investment for Renewal Work 168.8 202 - 204 231 -237 202 - 204 226 - 232 196 - 199
Government 48.0 56- 58 58 -63 56 -58 58 -63 56 -58
Residence 2 2 2 2 2 2
Non-residence(Building) 6 5.6 - 6.4 5.6 - 7.2 5.6 - 6.4 5.6 - 7.2 5.6 - 6.4
Civil Work 40.0 48.8 - 50.4 49.6 - 53.6 48.8 - 50.4 49.6 - 53.6 48.8 - 50.4
Private 121 146 174 146 168 140
Residence 49 58 63 58 63 58
Non-residence(Building) 49 65 80 65 78 63
Civil Work 23 22 30 22 27 18
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Figure 7-2 Future Renewal Market in Japan(Case-1)
The maintenance and repair market steadily grew during the 1990s in terms of flow,
thus gaining a larger share of the construction market, while construction investment is sluggish.
Future trends will remain the same as before. As discussed in Chapter 1, the government has to
manage all social capital assets focusing on the future repair or maintenance and plan with
particular emphasis on the life cycle cost (LCC) in order to reduce the cost spending. The
application of PFI has a potential to alleviate the economic difficulties in such stringent
circumstances now facing Japan.
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7.1.3. Renewal Market in Europe
The maintenance and repair in the construction market in Europe is now significantly
higher than that in Japan. Figure 7-3 shows the current status of construction investment in
Europe. Following Europe, the share in Japan will grow as its stock matures.
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Figure 7-3 Construction Market in Europe
In Europe, recycling society with a low impact on the environment had been of
particularly high interest to the public. Therefore, the idea of renewal or reconstruction of social
infrastructure has been adopted to urban development for a long time. Figure 7-4 and 7-5 shows
the current trends and short-term forecast of construction market in Europe subdivided to two
parts of west and east. Compare to Japanese market, both of West and East European
construction markets are growing steadily and the portion of renewal works is expected to
expand in the next three years. The amounts in renewal of civil and non-resident works are
around 200 billion euro in the West Europe and 10 billion euro in the East Europe respectively.
The application of private financing to the infrastructure development is widely
prevailed in Europe as observed in U.K.. Most countries have introduced and promoted those
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kinds of private financing for reforming and reconstructing aged infrastructures for a long time.
As in the previous example of European countries, Japanese government has to recognize and
deal with the growing needs for asset management.
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7.1.4. Market Interest for Renewal Projects
Figure 7-6 shows the results of a questionnaire survey conducted by Research Institute
of Construction and Economy, targeting 28 medium to largest construction companies in Japan.
The institute studied how Japanese contractors have an interest in the repair and renewal works
of infrastructure. The result says most countries accounts for less than 19 percent of average
construction sales to the renewal works in the past three years from 1999 to 2001. In particular,
the shares of renewal works in most medium companies are concentrating on the range of less
than 10% of average construction sales in the past. And the figure describes the larger companies
are likely to have larger amount of sales in renewal market. According to the results of a
questionnaire, most companies expect these figures to increase in the next three years from 2002
to 2004. Most companies estimated the increase to be 10%; large companies expected the rise to
be over 20%. Though many companies have a strong interest in renewal market, in fact, large
companies have advantage over medium companies in terms of personal and financial aspects.
Seventy percent of companies have already increased staffing levels and have created or
expanded corporate divisions to meet the increasing demand for renewal projects.
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7.2. Overseas Construction Market
7.2.1. Overseas Construction Amount
In the late 1980s, Japanese developers and manufactures invested much in North
America due to surplus liquidity and the yen's appreciation. U.S. and Canada were considered to
be low risk countries from many points of view. Japanese investors and manufactures wanted to
entrust the investments in these countries from Japan contributed to the mitigation of the trade
imbalance between Japan and U.S.
But in the early 1990s due to the bursting of the bubble economy in Japan, both of
public and private developers reduced their overseas investments and some manufactures shifted
their investment to Asia where is making great progress in economic development. Japan is close
to this area geographically and historically, hence many Japanese companies had already long
established a number of subsidiaries or branches there. As a result, they had a competitive
advantage compared to other areas. In recent years, over 65% of the total contract amount was
won in Asia.
Figure 7-7 shows the present status of construction activities abroad from 1994 to 2001.
Though the total amount of foreign investment has reduced during the past decade, the share of
the Asian market is still higher compare to that in 1994. Other foreign markets have been
shrinking. Especially after Asian currency crisis in 1998, environment for construction
investment became rapidly worse and Japanese government had to adopt an austerity policy.
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Figure 7-7 Foreign Investment Amount for Construction
7.2.2. Private Financing Market in Asian Countries
Due to the fiscal difficulties, most of the Asian countries has reduced capital investment
to the infrastructure development. For this reason, every government has to rely on the project
financing to private sectors. Table 7-2 shows the current status of infrastructure development by
private financing(mainly by BOT) in Asian countries(including Turkey).
Japan's private sector is well adapted to the PFI approach in the sense that public
agencies often place turnkey contracts. Private contractors have shown that they can successfully
undertake massive projects such as the Hong Kong undersea tunnel project carried out by
Japanese construction companies., and BOT contracts for electrical plants in the Philippines.
Since the 1980s, Japanese companies in Malaysia have accepted comprehensive orders based on
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new construction methods. In taking on public construction projects previously allocated among
specialized contractors in planning, design, licenses and approval, coordination, construction,
and maintenance, the Japanese firms have drastically reduced construction time and cut the
government's indirect expenses.
Interestingly, Malaysia's inefficient and rigid system, a legacy of British colonial rule,
was transformed through private sector technology and comprehensive contracts by Japan, who
is now in turn learning from PFI in the U.K. However, both the public sector and private
businesses who participate in the projects for the public lack the idea of serving the public
interest by delivering high quality public services at a reasonable price. Ensuring this requires
that transparency is achieved through fairness and disclosure.
In the past, overlooking this aspect has not only eroded the public sector's confidence in
government, but also increased global distrust and diminished expectations toward Japan's role in
the world. The time has come to introduce PFI oriented around public interest and thereby
reform the administration of social infrastructure and public services.
Table 7-2 Private Finance in Asian Countries
Power Road Seaport Airport Railroad House Water-w Sewage OthersPlant orks
China 0 0 - - - 0 0 0 Urban transport
Thailand - 0 - - 0 0 - ( Communication
Indonesia @ @ - - - - - -
Malaysia @ @ 0 - 0 - 0 0 Communication
South Korea 0 @ - - 0 0 - 0
Philippine © 0 - - 0 - 0 -
Myanmar - - 0 - - - Hotel, Office
Turkey @ @ 0 0 0 0 0 0
120
7.2.3. Private Financing Market in Developing Countries
Figure 7-8 shows the total amount of investment for the infrastructure development of
developing countries in the world. The total amount of investment in 1997 in its peak is over
$120 billion and around $900 billion in 2000.
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Figure 7-8 Investment for Infrastructure of Developing Country
Japan has been historically one of the biggest donor nations. Japan's Official
Development Assistance has expanded by four-fold over a period of 15 years, from $3.8 billion
in 1985 to its peak of $15.3 billion in 1999. The Japanese government eagerly increased official
aid to dampen pressure from abroad to recycle its huge accumulated trade surplus, and to take
commensurate responsibilities as an economic global superpower in the international
development community. Due to the prolonged recession in Japan, however, the public sector is
currently undergoing financial difficulties, and Japan's ODA budget will be reduced substantially
over the next few years. Upon publicizing the ODA mid-year policy in 1999, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs announced that Japan would no longer have the goal of increasing its total ODA,
but would instead improve the quality of ODA it provides.
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Figure 7-9 shows breakdown of ODA by Japan from 1994 to 2000. Social infrastructure
development in the ODA program has started in the beginning of the 1960s. In particular, basic
infrastructure such as roads and bridges has been developed as a main stem of ODA program.
Those structures have already experienced over 40 years of service and come to the end of its life.
Originally, the purpose of infrastructure ODA is not only providing social assets to the object
country but also technology transfers to the engineers working in the construction industry there.
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Figure 7-9 Official Development Assistance by Japan
Therefore, of most cases, project planning and original design of the structure has been
made by Japanese design consultant companies. In the sense of technology transfer, intricate
designs are tend to be adopted to the project, and hence, the construction is usually undertaken
by Japanese contractors in consideration of technological issues. In some cases, materials for the
project are imported from Japan and they are sometimes typical products which are not
manufactured and dealt with in many countries. In the context of such a background, countries at
receiving end are likely to face technological issues as well as financial difficulties in terms of
asset management, such as maintenance or repair after construction of the structure. In fact, this
kind of things may happen frequently behind the assistance to the developing countries.
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1 Social infrastructure, service
TMME !!- -tt
Since 1970, over $10 billion has been invested only for infrastructure development as a
grant of ODA program. The amount spent from 1971 to 1980 becomes more than twice as much
as it. The spending is accumulating every year and the amount of social capital stock in recipient
countries is growing rapidly. Most projects were strictly selected by project feasibility study and
the structures are now forming the foundation of the nation's infrastructure. In the near future,
those especially important infrastructure will need maintenance and repairs as Japanese
infrastructure needs them. However, under today's tight budgetary conditions Japan's ODA should
be more focused and strategy-oriented to achieve Japan's national interests, as well as the interests of
the developing countries and the international society as a whole. As a result of reduction of
investment by ODA program to this area, Japanese government is promoting the active utilization of
private financing scheme.
In this case, the private company has to negotiate with government of the country and
decide private finance scheme in order to correct capital spent for maintaining the structure. For
instance, in case the structure is bridge or road, private finance scheme is likely to be as
following Figure 7-10. After the government transfer the ownership of the structure, the private
company repairs and maintains it by own finance. After collecting total cost for maintenance and
management of the structure, the ownership is to be returned to the government.
Government
Return of
Transfer of ownership
ownership
Payment
Private company for service
(Repair, Maintenance
and management
Figure 7-10 Private Finance Scheme for Maintenance Work
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Originally, the government of the company should take responsibility for developing big
scale infrastructure. However, in case that the government has excessive expectations to the
development by foreign private companies, easy policy change or contract modification
concerned with the project price is often made by officers because of their lack of project
planning and management ability. This kind of issues caused by troublesome clients cannot be
solved only by the independent efforts of the private company. Japanese government intervention
is needed under such circumstances as a important public sector's role for private financing in
foreign countries.
China and India are the big markets of construction investment in which private
financing will have a good chance of success. However, high systemic and regulatory barriers are
blocking market entry by Japanese private sectors. In order to promote private sector's
investment to the foreign infrastructures, Japanese government has to enhance support measures
for protecting private sectors from various risks that the private company cannot deal with.
124
Chapter 8. Conclusion
The analysis in this thesis achieved the following conclusions;
Conclusion 1
The application of PFI has just started and it is still counterpart of original U.K. version.
In the true sense of evaluation of current Japanese PFI scheme, it needs some more years to
judge the quantity of Value For Money (VFM) until the expiration of the service (lease) period.
However, the Japanese government is steadily promoting the policy of private financing to the
infrastructure in order to revitalizing economy, and in this short- to mid-term, present PFI in
Japan, which is yet to be immature, must be changed to the original Japanese version of PFI by
making an adjustment to its market environment. Otherwise, it may undermine the public
interests as well as the private sector's profits. Besides, let alone VFM of the project, private
sectors may not only lose an incentive to make benefit in the private financing project but also be
discouraged to participate to the PFI itself. In the sense, the governments need to involve the
private sector's know-how from an earlier planning stage, for instance, the stage of estimation of
expected VFM in project feasibility study.
Conclusion 2
The success of PFI as a procurement method is becoming well established and a robust
procurement framework has been developing in Japan. In particular, prefectures and cities are
actively adopting PFI for infrastructure development and PFI project is more effective in cities
and prefectures in terms of government's ability of project management and cost-benefit
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optimization of the project. The operational benefits of PFI will take much more time to establish.
Some of the early signs of the benefits of focusing on project outputs, through risk identification
and management and on whole life costing have been promising. The long term VFM of PFI
projects will depend on how well the private sector manages the risks burdened on it and on the
public sector's success in managing the contracts over their duration, a significant proportion of
which are for over 20 years.
Conclusion 3
In the near future, cross-industry competition of infrastructure development will be
fierce with the rapid integration of the markets and construction companies will not be only the
one who can develop infrastructure in Japan. The PFI is creating the new idea for infrastructure
development and management in terms of providing social services as outputs instead of
supplying constructing facilities as hardware devices.
Conclusion 4
Private financing schemes can be significantly effective to rebuild the aging
infrastructures and to maintain the accumulated social capital stocks. The national government
has to establish new management system for the aged infrastructure and needs to preserve the
appropriate level of structural function and service provision of existing social capital stock with
considering the idea of Life Cycle Cost (LCC).
Conclusion 5
Elimination or reduction of regulations will ease restrictions on competition and expose
a wider range of areas to the principle of market competition. Businesses that the public sector
has undertaken will be privatized to help expand the scope where the principle of competition
can work.
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The analysis in this thesis, however, falls short to fully answering all of the questions,
and further research remains to be carried out. The author deeply hopes it will be of some
assistance to think about public private partnerships in the development of infrastructures toward
new era of Japanese construction industry.
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